Dr. Andrew Reddie is the Deputy Director of the Berkeley APEC Study Center and Assistant Professor of Practice at the University of California, Berkeley’s School of Information. He is also a senior engineer at Sandia National Laboratories where he works on projects related to cybersecurity, nuclear weapons policy, wargaming, and emerging military technologies. Andrew is currently a Bridging the Gap New Era fellow, Hans J. Morgenthau fellow at Notre Dame University, a non-resident fellow at the Brute Krulak Center at Marine Corps University, and research director at the Center for Long-Term Cybersecurity. Previously, Andrew served as deputy director of the Nuclear Policy Working Group, predoctoral researcher at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory’s Center for Global Security Research, and as an associate at the Council on Foreign Relations in Washington, DC.
His work has appeared in Science, the Journal of Cyber Policy, and the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists among other outlets and has been variously supported by the Carnegie Corporation of New York, MacArthur Foundation, and the U.S. Department of Energy’s Nuclear Science and Security Consortium.
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Content By Andrew Reddie – Deputy Director
Security of Supply: The Determinants of State Intervention in Emerging Technology Sectors
Asia Global Papers, 2021
Scholars and policymakers have been increasingly concerned about technological competition between China and the United States over the past decade – made worse in recent months amid broader disagreements on global trade and the handling of the Covid19 outbreak.
Economic Statecraft in the 21st Century: Implications for the Future of the Global Trade Regime
World Trade Review, 2021
This article introduces a special issue that examines the effects of strategic competition on the future of the global trade regime.
New Economic Statecraft: Industrial Policy in an Era of Strategic Competition
Issues & Studies: A Social Science Quarterly on China, Taiwan, and East Asian Affairs, 2020
The 2018 U.S. National Defense Strategy notes that the United States faces “an increasingly complex global security environment, characterized by overt challenges to the free and open international order and the re-emergence of long-term, strategic competition between nations.”
Hypersonic missiles: Why the new “arms race” is going nowhere fast
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 2020
Speaking on December 24, 2019, Russian President Vladimir Putin marked the deployment of Russia’s first nuclear-capable hypersonic missile system, noting, “Today, we have a unique situation in our new and recent history. [Other countries] are trying to catch up with us. Not a single country possesses hypersonic weapons, let alone continental-range hypersonic weapons.”
The US Needs an Industrial Policy for Cybersecurity
Defense One, 2019
President Trump’s recent Executive Order restricting the use of Huawei’s telecommunications equipment was hardly the first time the U.S. government has intervened in the private sector for purposes of national security.
Regulators Join Tech Rivalry with National-Security Blocks on Cross-Border Investment
Global Asia, 2019
Vinod K. Aggarwal and Andrew W. Reddie lay out the wide-ranging regulatory frameworks being put into place to submit foreign direct investment to greater scrutiny on national-security grounds.
Cyber Industrial Policy in an Era of Strategic Competition
Center for Long-term Cybersecurity White Paper Series, 2019
This paper provides an overview of many of the industrial policy approaches available to policymakers seeking to advance their cybersecurity industries, with an investigation of the consequences of policies for national and international economies as well as global governance frameworks.
Hypersonic Hysteria: Examining the Hypersonic Hammer
Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2018
There are substantial questions for policy-makers to answer as the United State weighs the inclusion of hypersonic weapons to its arsenal.
Design Matters: The Past, Present, and Future of the INF Treaty
Trust and Verify, 2021
In a discussion with journalists on 20 October 2018, US President Trump announced that the United States would seek to withdraw from the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, blaming Russian violations of the treaty as the reason for the decision.
Comparative Industrial Policy and Cybersecurity: A Framework for Analysis
Journal of Cyber Policy, 2018
This comparative project evaluates the role of firms, governments,
and other key stakeholders in the rise of industrial policy in
important states in the cybersecurity industry.
Comparative Inudstrial Policy and Cybersecurity: The US Case
Journal of Cyber Policy, 2018
This paper investigates the relationship between the US
government and its domestic cybersecurity sector drawing on the special issue framework.