Roundtable: Peter J. Katzenstein’s Contributions to the Study of East Asian Regionalism

Over the past decade, Peter J. Katzenstein has made enormous contributions to our theoretical and empirical understanding of Asian economic and security regionalism, which has been manifested by the proliferation of intra- and extraregional free trade agreements, regional financial institutions, and cooperative regional security dialogues. Katzenstein’s scholarly works on Asian regionalism and the changing role of Japan have set the pace for research in the field. In this article, a group of distinguished scholars in the field of Asian regionalism—Vinod K. Aggarwal, Min Gyo Koo, Amitav Acharya, Richard Higgott, and John Ravenhill—critically evaluate Katzenstein’s approach to the links among Japan, Asian regionalism, and global politics. In response, Katzenstein argues that Asian (and European) regionalism is linked to the “American imperium” and to core regional states and that regionalism is best studied with an eclectic approach. For him, regionalism is a force that defines the security, economic, and cultural dimensions of world politics, thus bringing to the field a modicum of order.

**Keywords:** regionalism, Asia, Europe, American imperium, Japan, China, Korea, Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), analytical eclecticism, free trade agreements (FTAs), security
The Evolution of Regionalism in East Asia

Vinod K. Aggarwal and Min Gyo Koo

We have seen dramatic changes in perceptions of East Asian regionalism in recent years. Only a decade ago, East Asian countries were believed to be inherently incapable of managing their own economic and security affairs in an institutionalized manner. East Asia seemed sandy soil for cultivating a sense of community and regional institutions in the post–World War II era, even when other parts of the world were busy surfing the wave of regionalism (albeit with varying success) following the birth of the European Community in 1958.

The Puzzles

Many attributed the lack of formal regionalism in East Asia to the so-called San Francisco System, which was codified through the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty between the Allies and Japan. Under the San Francisco System, a transregional institutional mix of bilateralism and multilateralism in both the economic and security issue areas—rather than intraregional minilateralism—became a defining feature of East Asia’s institutional cooperation. Against the background of bitter memories of Japanese colonialism, unresolved sovereignty issues, and an ideological divide across the region, the San Francisco System offered the United States’ East Asian allies access to the US market in return for “hub-and-spokes” bilateral security agreements. At the same time, US allies were strongly encouraged to participate in broad-based, multilateral forums with respect to both security—for example, the United Nations (UN)—and economics—the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Aside from informal networks based on corporate and ethnic ties, the San Francisco System created few incentives for East Asian countries to develop exclusive regional arrangements.

Yet the traditional institutional order in East Asia has come under heavy strain in the wake of what we call the post–“triple shocks”: post–Cold War, post–Asian financial crisis of 1997–1998, and post–September 11, 2001, attacks. Although East Asian countries maintain their traditional commitment to bilateral alliances and multilateral glob-
alism, the erosion of their confidence in the conventional approach is increasingly visible, as manifested by the burgeoning interest in intra-regional and extraregional preferential trade agreements (PTAs), regional financial institutions, and cooperative security dialogues.

Can formalized regional and interregional institutions better manage the increasing complexity of economic and security ties among the states in East Asia? How can we characterize the current evolution of East Asian regionalism in both economic and security terms? Among other countries, how has the role of Japan—as East Asia’s traditional economic workshop and security linchpin—evolved over the years? To what extent is East Asian regionalism linked to global politics in a world of regions, and not simply one of nation-states? And how might we systematically theorize about these questions?

Peter J. Katzenstein has made enormous contributions to our theoretical and empirical understanding of East Asian economic and security regionalism. Over the past decade, his many books, edited volumes, and journal articles on regionalism and the changing role of Japan have set the pace for research in the field. We believe that the time is now ripe to assess Katzenstein’s approach to the links among Japan, Asian regionalism, and global politics. To do so, we focus on four of his representative works. Our objective is to assess both his empirical contributions and his analytical approach, and in doing so to explore the types of institutional solutions that may be both likely and feasible in Asia.

The Contribution: East Asian Regionalism in Comparative Perspective

Much work in the 1980s and early 1990s sharply contrasted the deepening and widening integration in Europe with the limited “success” of efforts to create formal regionwide institutions in Asia. In response to this traditional, and inherently Eurocentric, perspective, Katzenstein (1997, 3) warned that such a comparison and view of success was misleading because it inadequately differentiated the varying degrees of scope, character, and depth of regional integration.³

Viewing regional economic and security integration as an open-ended process, Katzenstein’s analysis focused on the “inclusive character of Asia’s market-driven network-style integration in contrast to the exclusive character of Europe’s emphasis on formal institutions” (1997, 3). For Katzenstein, Asian regionalism operated not only under
the auspices of a private-public link between private keiretsu networks and the Japanese government but also through the efforts of overseas Chinese across East Asia. As such, he argued that East Asian regionalism was shaped primarily by bottom-up economic integration that obviated or at least substituted for formal rule-based regional institutions.

Indeed, whether in the economic or security realm, efforts to strengthen existing minilateral institutions have a very mixed record. Despite the utility of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) as Asia’s most vigorous economic institutions and despite considerable discussion to make them more effective, their strength has been fairly limited at best. Moreover, the fact that these organizations have taken on issues beyond the scope of their original economic mission has further diluted their residual institutional impact on their member states. On the security front, Asia lacks an equivalent of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). In Asia, traditional alliances have been bilateral, leaving security coordination at the minilateral level underinstitutionalized. Together with large US military forces stationed in Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and Guam, bilateral security treaties became the backbone of the US hub-and-spokes strategy to contain communist China and the Soviet Union in Asia. The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), which was launched in 1994, was virtually the only intergovernmental forum for security dialogue in Asia.

In explaining this difference in outcome between a network-style economic institutional outcome and a bilateral security focus in Asia—as contrasted with the creation of regional institutions in Europe—Katzenstein examines the role of international power, norms, and domestic state structures (1997, 7–11, 23–31).

From a power perspective, he emphasizes US preferences in its engagement with Asia and Europe, particularly with what he terms the core regional states of Japan in Asia and Germany in Europe. Because the United States was relatively more powerful vis-à-vis Asia than vis-à-vis Europe, there was little incentive for the United States to constrain its policy options within minilateral institutions in Asia. As he argues, however, over time, with the relative decline of US power compared to that of Asia, the United States became more willing to countenance greater institutionalization.

With specific reference to Japan and Germany, he emphasizes their role of defeated major powers that became key client states in the “American imperium,” thereby helping to stabilize Asia and Europe in
the postwar period. In his view, this latter arrangement suited Japan and Germany well. In Japan’s case, the combination of a broad-based trade regime centered on the GATT and World Trade Organization (WTO) and on *keiretsu*-based regional production networks allowed it to circumvent trade and operational barriers in Asian markets. Despite some hiccups in the late 1970s and early 1990s, the US defense commitment to Japan and Asia remained strong. And for Germany, its increasing embeddedness in institutions such as NATO and the European Union (EU) helped direct its power to building and working through the EU. By becoming part of a “Grotian” community at the European, Atlantic, and global levels (2005, 101), it was increasingly able to assuage its neighbors’ fear of German power.

Turning to norms, Katzenstein’s argument focuses both on the role of the US and on regional differences in Asia and Europe. In terms of the US role, cooperation with Europe and US support for its regional institutions stemmed from both the “concept of a Western community (Christian, democratic, capitalist)” (1997, 24) and a shared vision of a community among Europeans themselves. By contrast, deep ideological and cultural divisions across Asia inhibited the emergence of a collective regional identity, thus militating against broad-based, effective Asian institutions (1997, 7–12).

Finally, with respect to domestic factors, he argues that Asian states’ broad aversion to formal institutions stems from their fear of compromising their hard-earned national sovereignty in the postwar period. As Katzenstein and others point out, Asian states’ blind pursuit of Westphalian sovereignty made them less willing to constrain it, albeit partially, for the purpose of regional integration in formal institutions, particularly ones that would likely be dominated by major powers. Indeed, Asian states remain largely suspicious that international institutions and big powers might trap them in a bureaucratic mechanism not of their own making, as they did during the colonial period. In addition, East Asian states have only recently moved toward more democratic forms of government, in contrast with the significantly longer postwar democratization of the bulk of European states. Though controversial, many scholars, including Katzenstein, maintain that stable democracies are more likely to cooperate with each other than with authoritarian regimes or transitional democracies.

In looking forward, particularly in *A World of Regions (AWR)*, Katzenstein argues that both Asia and Europe have been, and will continue to be, sharply influenced by globalization and internationalization, which the United States has been active in promoting. For him,
globalization refers to the emergence of new networks of transnational actors and internationalization to the growth of transborder flows among states. Because of these broad trends, he argues that Asia and Europe will remain porous regions, even if a new core emerges in these regions. This claim is in sharp contrast to oft-cited fears of the development of a world of closed regional blocs, or an economic vision of a pure world of global interdependence where neither states nor regions play a crucial role.

**The Method: Analytical Eclecticism**

In terms of analytical approach, Katzenstein and his collaborators work at the intersection of international relations (IR), comparative politics, and area studies. They draw on a variety of theoretical perspectives from these fields to “eclectically” theorize about Asian economic and security regionalism. According to Katzenstein (1997, 6), IR scholars and area specialists both fail to capture regional dynamics properly. The former tends to downplay the local or national contexts specific to regionalism. In sharp contrast, area specialists pay insufficient attention to the broader structural and comparative conditions under which regional developments take place. As Katzenstein and Okawara (2001–2002, 154) argue, “Extolling, in the abstract, the virtues of a specific analytical perspective to the exclusion of others is intellectually less important than making sense of empirical anomalies and stripping notions of what is ‘natural’ of their intuitive plausibility.”

With respect to Asian economic and security regionalism and Japan’s shifting role therein, Katzenstein (1997, 6) seeks to avoid these analytical biases by eschewing “the self-consciously sparse theories of IR”—be they realist, liberal, or constructivist. Instead, he offers “an interdisciplinary approach that situates the subject of Japan and Asia in terms of political economy and culture, and then combines a historical approach with institutional analysis applied to issues of political economy, culture, and security” (1997, 6). From his perspective, the complex linkages among power, interests, and norms “defy analytical capture by any one paradigm” and are made more intelligible “by drawing selectively on different paradigms—that is, by analytical eclecticism, not parsimony” (2001–2002, 154).

In reading Katzenstein’s contributions, one cannot help being struck by the subtlety and nuances of his arguments. In his hands, and particularly in AWR, he approaches the exploration of comparative regionalism...
from a diversity of analytical perspectives, and his claim that sparse theoretical approaches are wanting seems convincing. Yet when one reads his edited volumes, one is also struck by the difficulty of asking other scholars to systematically utilize such a complex approach. Although individual contributions are often very strong, it is hard to see how they follow a framework or how an analytical eclectic approach can provide us with means to achieve greater knowledge cumulation and greater understanding of regional trends. Thus, it is not always clear that analytical eclecticism has met the criterion of superiority that Katzenstein and his collaborators have defined as being “dependent not on its ability to solve specific problems already identified by one or another research tradition, but on the possibility of expanding the scope of research problems beyond that of each of the competing research traditions.”

A second issue concerns the benefits of sacrificing analytical parsimony in the interest of “heuristic” explanatory power. Because we believe that assessing the relative contributions of different theories is more fruitful than a bullheaded defense of a single epistemological approach, we are sympathetic to Katzenstein’s synthetic efforts. But in lieu of a method to combine approaches or to assess the relative weights of variables, analytical eclecticism falls prey to the criticism of being an “everything-but-the-kitchen-sink” or ad hoc approach to theory building. Aside from these explanatory variable issues, there is still a lack of clear definition of “dependent” variables—be it “normal” or “natural” Japanese or Asian regionalism. For Katzenstein and Okawara, history “is an open-ended process in which the accumulation of events and experience from one period alters the contours of the next” (2001–2002, 156). We agree that the future of Asian regionalism is certainly open in this regard. But in considering likely trends in Asian regionalism, analytical eclecticism as presented in Katzenstein’s various works does not seem to enable us to systematically rule out certain outcomes or explore alternative scenarios for the future of Asia’s institutional architecture based on a falsifiable set of variables.

The Future? Asia’s New Institutional Architecture

As we have argued, the traditional institutional equilibrium in Asia has come under heavy strain in light of the post-“triple shocks.” The abrupt end of the Cold War bipolarity, which had acted as the source of regional reluctance to institutionalize economic and security relations, has made it politically easier for Asian countries to consider institutionalizing their
economic and security ties. The Asian financial crisis of 1997–1998 clearly revealed a number of institutional weaknesses that Asian economies shared. The September 11 terrorist attacks and the subsequent US war on global terrorism have called into question the fate of the Asian balance-of-power system, which in turn has created additional incentives for Asian countries to cope with growing economic and security uncertainties through institutionalized mechanisms. In view of these post–“triple shocks,” we now turn to assess whether these developments will indeed lead to a new institutional architecture and if these possible changes are anticipated in Katzenstein’s recent work.

In the post–“triple shocks” period, the new dynamics of rivalry and cooperation among states at both the intraregional and transregional levels are shaping new institutional pathways. Political and business leaders from Northeast and Southeast Asia interact with each other more frequently. South Asia’s engagement with East Asia in recent years has been truly impressive. In a world of global energy shortages, oil- and gas-rich Central Asian countries have attracted attention from their East Asian counterparts, particularly China, Japan, and South Korea.

With respect to trade, the commitment of many Asian countries to a broad-based, multilateral trade regime is currently in question, because the Doha Round of WTO negotiations has made little progress since its inception in 2001. At the transregional level, APEC has been unsuccessful as a formal mechanism to facilitate economic integration. With respect to informal market integration, the unprecedented economic shocks at the end of the 1990s have demonstrated that the seemingly dense Japanese and overseas Chinese business networks are quite vulnerable. As a result, a growing number of Asian countries are now actively pursuing greater institutionalization at the submultilateral level, weaving a web of PTAs with each other—supplemented by corporate and ethnic business ties—and departing from their traditional emphasis on the GATT/WTO.

With respect to security, the San Francisco System has been gradually modified since the early 1970s by the inclusion of China and other communist countries but until recently has hewed remarkably closely to its original Japan-centric, Washington-dominated form. In the post–September 11 era, however, the fissures in the system have become increasingly visible, primarily because of changes in US alliance policy. With its counterterrorism initiatives orchestrated by the “neoconservatives” who dominated foreign policy in the early years of the George W. Bush administration, the United States began reconfiguring its traditional security policy in Asia for strategic and logistical reasons.
In lieu of unilaterally shouldering the security burden, the United States has also solicited multilateral cooperation to fight terrorism and to scale down its forward deployment. To maintain its strategic strength despite a smaller physical presence and a severe loss of respect and prestige, Washington has begun to urge its Asian allies to expand their regional security missions, which has led to a number of regional cooperation initiatives. APEC and the ARF, encouraged by the United States, have adopted a series of antiterrorism measures. Although antiterrorism cooperation undertaken by regional organizations focuses on intelligence and information exchanges rather than on substantive measures, and although existing institutions are still rooted deeply in antihegemonic norms, there has increasingly been exploration of more rigorous efforts to institutionalize security affairs at the regional level, such as the Six-Party Talks and the Proliferation Security Initiative to resolve North Korea’s nuclear crisis.

So what is driving Asia’s new institutional architecture? We find the answer in the new preference of Asian countries for “collective goods”—particularly, club goods as opposed to public or private goods. As Katzenstein himself points out, Asian regionalism is centered on “a convergence of interests in the provision of some collective goods” (1997, 23). But in his analytically eclectic approach, he does not utilize the analytical characterization of different types of goods—private, club, common pool resources, and public—as a key element that helps account for shifts in the region.

Specifically, in our view, the post-“triple shocks” have altered the supply of trade liberalization and national security as collective goods by creating either positive or negative externalities for countries that are not immediate participants in the precipitating event. More specifically, Asia’s new appetite for PTAs and regional security dialogues reflects a convergence of interests in securing inclusive club goods as an insurance policy to realize free trade and collective security when the provision of trade liberalization and regional security as de facto public goods under the San Francisco System stalls or is steadily dismantled.

Set against this backdrop, there has been a nuanced departure in Katzenstein’s recent works (2001–2002, 2005, and 2006) from his earlier argument that loose-structured production networks, and a hub-and-spokes system, could be a viable alternative to formal institutionalization in Asia. He now argues that “Asia-Pacific security affairs . . . rest on a firm foundation of formal and informal bilateral agreements, supplemented by a variety of embryonic multilateral agreements” (2001–2002, 158). And in Beyond Japan (BJ), in rejecting the idea that
China’s rise is creating a distinctive China-centered Asian regionalism, he claims that the shifting role of other state actors and nonstate actors is leading to “regionalism and regionalization in East Asia . . . in a space beyond all national models” (2006, 33). To a large extent, his new claims are in line with his old views, but nowhere in his work does he clearly recognize this departure.

In both *AWR* and *BJ*, the focus of the arguments revolves around the interaction of Japan and Germany in Asia and Europe, respectively, and their links to the American imperium. The excessive concern with Japan’s and Germany’s continued role in these books, however important in the past, detracts from the need to understand the complex interplay among Japan, China, Taiwan, India, South Korea, North Korea, ASEAN, and the United States. Despite its title, *BJ* fails to capture the new dynamics of regionalism in Asia. The introductory chapter’s downplaying of the key role that China is likely to play in the future seems overly defensive. Although we agree that claims about China’s new role as the only determinant of Asia’s future are overblown, we do not believe that a focus on the United States–Japan connection takes us far enough in the analysis of emerging Asian regionalism in which China’s active engagement in both regional and global institutions is challenging Japan’s place in the American imperium.

As noted, Katzenstein argues that Asia and Europe will remain porous regions owing to their links to the American imperium. Yet in the face of the post–“triple shocks” and the resultant changes in Asian countries’ preferences for different types of goods, it is not enough to claim that “FTAs tend to be stepping stones, not stumbling blocks, for porous regions” (2005, 25) without providing evidence for this central contested claim. Instead, it is more useful to explore the conditions under which these agreements are likely to evolve into broader accords and those under which they might lead to “pernicious” bilateralism that undermines the WTO by failing to be firmly nested in this institution.

Using an “institutional map” designed to systematically look at the dynamic interaction of key powers and broader institutions, our previous work constructed simplified scenarios of possible institutional paths that East Asia is likely to take. For us, the “porousness” of East Asian regionalism primarily depends on the following causal variables: (1) the strength of the WTO and APEC, (2) the Sino-Japanese relationship, (3) economic complementarity among countries, and (4) the “balance of interests” between the United States and the EU concerning Asia as their trading and security partner region.
For instance, if both the WTO and APEC are weak, considerable institutional space and a multiplicity of options are likely to emerge. If China and Japan reach a political alliance, the formation of a strong Northeast Asian Free Trade Agreement (NEAFTA) is highly likely. If economic complementarities exist among the member countries, they will broaden the scope of product coverage; otherwise, we can expect a strong but narrow (or sectoral) NEAFTA. By contrast, if there is no alliance between China and Japan, a NEAFTA is not a possibility.

Certainly Northeast Asia, and more broadly East Asia, will remain a porous region if either the United States or the EU, or both, maintain(s) a strong focus on the region. However, if the United States continues its focus on the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) and the EU continues on an eastward and possibly southward expansion path, others may feel excluded. Under these circumstances, the decade-long perception between Northeast and Southeast Asians that Western regional arrangements are forming against them may well rekindle the Mahathir-promoted notion of an exclusive East Asian bloc—be it East Asia Summit or ASEAN+3 (or +6)—or a new China-centered regional hierarchy.12

Indeed, the excessive concern with where Japan stands today undermines a number of Katzenstein’s own insights on Chinese “technonationalism” (2005, 113) and what this approach might mean for more formal economic and security regionalism. Although it is easy to dismiss the talk in Asia of ASEAN+3 (which includes Japan, South Korea, and China) versus ASEAN+6 (which also includes Australia, New Zealand, and India), the November 2006 announcement that the United States would like to promote a Free Trade Area of the Asia Pacific (FTAAP) suggests that these new efforts to promote Asian regionalism, on the one hand, and the rise of China, on the other, are garnering concern among policymakers in Washington.

Although we cannot disagree with Katzenstein’s claim that “prediction is a notoriously risky business in the study of world politics (2005, 247), we believe that more systematic exploration of key variables and their impact in the context of the design of institutions may provide us with more precise, albeit contingent, outcomes. Of course, even if we manage to devise a better model to gain insights into the future of East Asia (which we are hardly bold enough to claim at this point!), the title of our 2005 article, “Beyond Network Power,” illustrates our intellectual debt to Peter Katzenstein’s pathbreaking contributions as a touchstone for analyzing Asian regionalism.
Peter Katzenstein is the exception among US and Western gurus of international relations (IR) in having recognized the importance of Asian regionalism (and Asia more generally) as a subject worthy of serious theoretical investigation. For long, Asia received little attention from senior Western IR scholars, especially those studying international regimes and institutions. For example, the highly influential book *Multilateralism Matters*—edited by John Ruggie, who coined the term “international regimes”—contains no chapter on Asian institutions.13 The region did not merit attention beyond a paragraph in his introductory chapter, presumably because “it was not possible to construct multilateral institutional frameworks there in the immediate postwar period.”14 Robert Keohane, the most celebrated scholar of international institutions, whose work founded neoliberal institutionalism, disarmingly confesses to “Americanocentrism” in the introductory chapter of *International Institutions and State Power*—despite the title of that chapter, “Theory of World Politics.”15 In contrast, Katzenstein, who began his academic career by mainly studying Europe, has paid serious and sustained attention to Asian regionalism for over a decade. He can rightly be credited with “mainstreaming” Asian regionalism in IR theory, or “bringing Asia in” to the theory of international institutions. His interest in Asian regionalism has been inspiring for many scholars, such as myself, who have benefited by having their subject matter receive more international theoretical attention in what had otherwise been a Eurocentric field.

Katzenstein’s approach to the study of Asian regionalism is notable in four ways: its comparative focus, covering both Europe and Asia; its synthetic or “eclectic” approach, marrying rationalism with constructivism; its straddling of both political economy and security issue areas; and its recognition of the area studies approach to a degree seldom found in the work of scholars trained in the disciplinary tradition of IR. This broad eclecticism underpins *A World of Regions*,16 which is without question the most important comparative study of European and Asian regionalism. Highly creative, breathtakingly ambitious, and a pleasure to read, *A World of Regions*, unlike other comparative studies of regional orders, notably Barry Buzan and Ole Waever’s mammoth *Regions and Powers*,17 covers both security and political economy. And...
unlike many IR scholars who frown upon area studies for its atheoretical nature, Katzenstein embraces it heartily—although he is not, and does not claim to be, a traditional area specialist (which would require mastering a local language, going native in the region, and achieving eminence in the area studies fraternity and professional associations).

In this essay, I comment on two aspects of Peter Katzenstein’s contribution to the study of Asian regionalism. The first is his comparison of Asian and European regionalisms. The second is his articulation of the relationship between regions and the hegemon, or what he calls the “American imperium.” My focus is primarily on *A World of Regions*, not the least because this brings together his decade of scholarship on Asian regionalism from a comparative perspective, which began with the famous and highly influential essay “Regionalism in Comparative Perspective.”

### Europe Versus Asia

Katzenstein regards Europe and Asia as the most important sites of geopolitical and economic interaction in today’s world. While both exhibit considerable “porousness,” owing to the forces of globalization and internationalization, there are key differences. In particular, Katzenstein contrasts European regionalism’s more “formal and political” character and its greater reliance on “state bargains and legal norms” with Asia’s “informal and economic” character and greater reliance on “market transactions and ethnic or national capitalism” (2005, 27, 219). A second difference concerns the role of what Katzenstein calls “core states” (states that play the key role in organizing the region while serving the interest of the United States): Germany and Japan. Germany displays a far greater propensity for multilateral action within Europe, so much so that its national identity has become Europeanized. By contrast, Japan retains a strong sense of national identity and remains wedded to bilateral over multilateral arrangements (2005, 36). Third, European and Asian regionalism differ in terms of their attitudes toward sovereignty. “Europe’s regionalism is more transparent and intrusive than Asia’s,” while “absent in Asia are the pooling of sovereignty and far-reaching multilateral arrangements that typify Europe’s security order” (2005, 219, 125).

What accounts for these differences? Katzenstein begins by explaining the puzzle of why postwar Asia did not develop a NATO-like alliance (2005, 50–60). His earlier collaborative work with Christopher Hemmer argued that US policymakers viewed their European allies as “relatively equal members of a shared community,” while the potential...
Asian allies were seen as “an alien and . . . inferior community.” The greater sense of a transatlantic community compared to a transpacific one explains why Europe rather than Asia was seen by the United States as a more desirable arena for its multilateral engagement. The same explanation is repeated in *A World of Regions*.

Beyond the US role, Katzenstein identifies three factors—state power, regime type, and state structures (2005, 220)—that explain the differences between European and Asian regionalism. European regionalism is a regionalism of relatively equal neighbors, of similar regime types, and of states with well-functioning bureaucracies. Intra-Asian relations are more hierarchical, Asian political regimes differ widely, and Asian states are “non-Weberian” in the sense that “rule by law” rather than “rule of law” is more commonplace. Although Katzenstein finds that East Asia is yet to develop regional institutions for issues of internal (intrastate) internal security (2005, 127), cross-cutting bilateral internal security arrangements accompanied the founding of the Association of East Asian Nations (ASEAN), while the Shanghai Cooperation Organization is undertaking regional internal security cooperation against terrorism, separatism, and extremism.

A fundamental difference between European and Asian regionalism is that while the former has been led by relatively strong states (both in terms of capability and cohesion)—Germany and France—Asian regionalism (especially its formal institutions) has been led by a group of essentially smaller and weaker states (again, in terms of both capability and cohesion)—ASEAN—where regime survival and preservation of Westphalian sovereignty are paramount concerns. But I think Katzenstein’s perspective on Asian regionalism underplays the value of small power leadership because of the central role he accords to the United States and Japan. Realists see ASEAN’s central role in Asian regionalism as a structural limitation, although this very feature may account for a considerable part of ASEAN’s viability and the emergence of Asian regional institutions such as the ASEAN Regional Forum and ASEAN+3. Katzenstein’s Japan-centered perspective obscures the agency role of ASEAN. While ASEAN may not be the leader of Asian regionalism, it certainly has been the hub. This is not to suggest that the ASEAN-centered regionalism has been without limitations and failures. Because ASEAN has lacked structural power, its main contribution to Asian regionalism has been normative and social. But its nature as a coalition of “weak states” has been vital in creating the image of a neutral broker and in generating the trust necessary for drawing China and other actors who were initially reluctant to engage in regional institution building.
Katzenstein’s observation, backed by fascinating snippets from historical records, that US policymakers viewed Asia and Europe in a very different light is undoubtedly valid. But it places too much explanatory faith in the US policymakers’ perceptions of US collective identity while ignoring normative opposition to collective defense from Asia’s nationalist leaders (such as India’s Jawaharlal Nehru). It was this opposition, played out in regionalist conferences, including the meetings of the Colombo Powers in 1954 (the year of the formation of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, SEATO) and the Asia-Africa Conference in Bandung in 1955, that delegitimized NATO-like arrangements by viewing them as unequal alliances with a potential to serve as new instruments of Western dominance. This had considerable resonance in the emerging postcolonial milieu in Asia, especially with the growing superpower intervention in Indochina.

Indeed, this is a fundamental difference between Asian and European regionalism, much more important than the role of the United States. The emergence of European regionalism consummated the declining legitimacy of nationalism—blamed for two world wars—whereas in Asia regionalism was founded on the aspirations of its nationalist leaders. In Europe, nationalism and regionalism clashed, but in Asia, they enjoyed a symbiotic relationship. Indeed, Japan’s approach to security as well as economic regionalism, opting for a “network” style rather than a formal institutionalist approach, was partly due to its fear of stoking Asian nationalist (anti-Japanese) sentiments that would have accompanied any effort to develop a formal regional group under Japan’s leadership. In this important sense, the trajectory of Asian regionalism and its core feature (i.e., it would be ASEAN-led rather than great power–led) was neither Japan’s nor America’s choice. No comparison of Europe and Asia should ignore this critical area of difference.

The difference with Europe could not be more stark. It would suggest not only a historical explanation of difference, but an important structural one as well: that small powers may resist or exhibit skepticism toward incorporation into broader regional arrangements.

Katzenstein’s comparison of the two regionalisms may seem to suggest the essential superiority of the European model. But this would be a serious misreading of his position. He does not see the European model to be the benchmark against which the successes or failures of Asian regionalism must be judged. “It would . . . be a great mistake to compare European ‘success’ with Asian ‘failure.’ Such a Eurocentric view invites the unwarranted assumption that the European experience sets the standard by which Asian regionalism should be measured.”
Instead, he suggests that the “scope, depth, and character” of regionalism should acknowledge variations across “numerous dimensions and among world regions.”  

Underlying this perspective is a larger theoretical point: “Theories based on Western, and especially West European, experience have been of little use in making sense of Asian regionalism.” An opposing view may be John Ikenberry and Michael Mastanduno, who uphold the relevance of Western theoretical frameworks in studying the international relations of the Asia-Pacific. While political relations among Asian states might have distinctive characteristics, especially in earlier historical epochs, Asia has become progressively integrated into the international system during the past century and has taken on the behavioral norms and attributes associated with that system. Hence, variables and concepts belonging to international relations theory—for example, hegemony, the distribution of power, international regimes, and political identity—are as relevant in the Asia-Pacific context as anywhere else.

My own view lies somewhere in between; while acknowledging that Western frameworks do apply to Asia, I side with Katzenstein’s view that this should not justify using them to judge the “performance” of Asian institutions. More important, it is not enough to simply look for the fit between these frameworks and Asian experiences, but it is also necessary to offer theoretically relevant generalizations from Asia on its own terms. In other words, Asia should be seen not merely as the testing ground for Western theory or theories derived primarily from the West, but also as an arena out of which one can develop original theoretical insights that can be exported and applied at the global level or to other regions of the world.

A final point about the Europe-Asia comparison suggested by Katzenstein deserves attention. Despite highlighting the distinctive regional identities of Europe and Asia shaped by cultural or civilizational forces, Katzenstein does not view them to be permanent or insurmountable. Past or current differences between Europe and Asia do not portend continued divergence. Challenging Huntington’s clash of civilizations thesis, he argues that while regions are not converging around common patterns of industrialization, democratization, and secularization, “it would be wrong to insist that because regions have differed in the past, so they are destined to differ in the future.” Contrasting this with the arguments of those who have popularized the notion that Europe and Asia constitute two distinctive paradigms of international relations. These perspectives hold that in Europe, specifically Western Europe, economic interdependence, multilateral institutions,
and liberal democratic domestic political structures sustain deep-rooted and durable peace. In Asia, the absence of these conditions foreshadows heightened anarchy and regional disorder. Are we then to adopt Katzenstein’s logic that Europe and Asia are in different stages of the same historical process of state and region formation, rather than in fundamentally divergent trajectories? One wishes here for greater explanation and clarity in Katzenstein’s perspective.

Regions and the Hegemon

The second aspect of Katzenstein’s contribution to the study of Asian regionalism that I would like to comment on is the pivotal role he assigns to the United States or the American imperium in its creation and evolution. This flows from his general thesis: it is the “U.S. policy [that] has made regionalism a central feature of world politics” (2005, 24). Not only did the United States determine “why there was no NATO in Asia.” Katzenstein’s world of regions is also founded on a dual hierarchy, between the US imperium and the supporting regional “core” states (Germany in Europe and Japan in Asia), and between the latter and others in their respective regions. The notion of a core state is “central” to Katzenstein’s argument. These states provide “steady support for American purpose and power while also playing an important role in the region’s affairs” (2005, 237). But it is US power that matters most. Even globalization and internationalization, central processes that make regions porous, often work “in accordance with the power and purpose of the American imperium” (2005, 13).

Such a view begs the question: how can regions have autonomy—a central point in his book—if US power plays such a dominant role in creating and managing them? Regionalism has been possible in some parts of the world despite, rather than because of, US policy. The United States was not a key factor behind the formation of the League of Arab States or the Organization of African Unity (now African Union). ASEAN was formed as an indigenous alternative to the US-backed SEATO. The United States initially opposed security multilateralism (ASEAN Regional Forum) in post–Cold War Asia, calling it a “solution in search of a problem.”

Katzenstein’s notion of core states and their role in regional order is also problematic and a bit outdated, especially in the contemporary Asian context. Core states are supposed to serve US power and purpose, but one must also account for the possibility of those states challenging the
ideas and influences of the imperium. This may not involve a material challenge but may be grounded on normative differences and divergent institutional priorities between the core states. Recent US-German disagreement over Iraq is a case in point. In East Asia, Japan, while remaining within the US security orbit, has shown occasional willingness to organize its own economic space, especially when the region faces a crisis (such as during the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis in 1997 when it proposed an Asian monetary system to counter the US-dominated International Monetary Fund).

More importantly, Katzenstein ignores the possibility that the core states’ ability to serve US interests may be subject to challenges from their peers within the same regions. China’s challenge to Japan’s regional primacy, hence to Tokyo’s ability to function as a core state under his model (2005, 91–92), underscores this possibility. Japan is vulnerable to China’s challenge not just materially but, as Katzenstein himself notes, also ideationally. After all, it was China that had the central role in the historical identity of East Asia. And “Japan’s inability to recognize its militarist past reinforces political suspicion throughout Asia, and its atypical national security policy has had remarkably little influence in reshaping Asia’s regional security order” (2005, 140). Both realists and constructivists have recognized emerging Chinese regional dominance. John Mearsheimer sees this as a possible Chinese Monroe Doctrine, while David Kang foresees a benign and stable Sinocentric regional order akin to the economic exchange and geopolitical norms of the old tributary system. While Japan will continue to be important, and the rise of China will not lead to a revival of the old tributary system, the ascendancy of China and India does challenge the model central to A World of Regions by raising the possibility of new regional powers replacing the old core states that support US interests and even challenging the imperium directly. While the “core states” model may seem valid for the 1970s–1990s, it was less so for Asia in the immediate aftermath of World War II, when Japan was still recovering from the war, and will be progressively less so in the twenty-first century as the ascendancy of China and India gives rise to new and different types of regionalisms in Asia—regionalisms less wedded to US power and purpose.

Katzenstein does address the issue of resistance to US power at the societal level, especially in his treatment of anti-Americanism. This is a welcome departure from commonplace state-centric accounts of Asian regionalism. He also speaks of “two-way Americanization”: while America changes others, “others change America, at home and abroad” (2005, 198). Hence, in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks,
Americans became more security conscious and conservative. Many now see the waging of preemptive war as a legitimate form of self-defense. The unilateralism and assertiveness of current American foreign policy thus finds broad public support. . . . American imperium has the capacity to shape a world of regions. But that world has the capacity to react, often with a complex mixture of admiration and resentment and occasionally with violent fury—thus remaking America. (2005, 206)

This, however, is not feedback but “blowback.” The United States is not necessarily learning from others or adapting to the ways of others, but rather turning inward and nationalistic in reacting to virulent and militant forms of anti-Americanism that its own power and dominance generate. The important question for a world of regions is whether and under what conditions regions will resist America and whether America will learn from the regions. The answer to this requires looking into regionalism, both past and current, that excludes the United States or socializes US power on its own, rather than America’s, terms. In East Asia, for example, ASEAN’s Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality concept sought to reduce the role of outside powers, including the United States, from regional security. While this was not very successful, the normative aspirations for security self-reliance have inspired and will continue to inspire regional autonomy in Latin America’s Southern Cone. In Asia, the nascent East Asia summit and the vision of an East Asian community exclude US participation, even if they will not lend themselves to Chinese dominance. In Europe, the dramatic rupture in US-EU relations over the war in Iraq has fueled sentiments toward European security autonomy, pushing the EU further in the direction of developing its own peace operations capabilities for out-of-area missions (such as Aceh in Indonesia). But while ASEAN has not sought to exclude the United States from the region, it has developed normative and social mechanisms in which the United States would play follower (and peer among a number of external “dialogue partners”) rather than leader.

Conclusion

Peter Katzenstein’s contribution to the study of Asian regionalism has introduced greater richness and complexity to an increasingly important area of inquiry that has traditionally attracted few grand theorists of IR. But it is possible to imagine “a world of regions” beyond Katzenstein’s stylized model of two specific regions organized around two specific
core states functioning in the context of a specific phase in the US position and role as the global superpower. While this might describe post-war regionalisms (broadly defined, more than just formal institutions) in Europe and Asia to a considerable extent, it has limits when applied to the contemporary and emerging regional architecture of Asia.

As Katzenstein himself notes, regions are social constructs, although for him regionalist ideas and discourses are far less important than hegemonic directive—a point with which I disagree. Just as the concept of a region is a fluid one, the shape of regional orders, the identity of core states, and the durability of hegemonic socialization are also time-bound phenomena that are subject to alteration through shifting material and ideational circumstances.

Moreover, if regions truly matter in world politics, as *A World of Regions* suggests, then we need to demonstrate that they have some ability to self-organize and to resist and/or socialize hegemonic power, rather than simply playing to the hegemon’s tune. This would be consistent with the two-way relationship between regions and the American imperium that Katzenstein correctly recognizes but insufficiently theorizes. Arjun Appadurai, participant in the “regional worlds” project at the University of Chicago, challenges us to “recognize that areas are not just places, but are also locations for the production of other world-pictures, which also need to be part of our sense of these other worlds.”

To extend this logic, Asia (as well as Europe and other regions of the world) can be expected to articulate its own image of US dominance and produce self-generating modes of interaction that would shape the legitimacy of the American imperium in the twenty-first century. To get a complete picture of the emerging regional architecture of world politics, Katzenstein’s world of “made in America” regions needs to be reconciled with “regional worlds” made from within.

**The Theory and Practice of Regionalism in East Asia: Peter Katzenstein’s Value Added**

*Richard Higgott*

For well over two decades, scholarship on both the theory and practice of regionalism in East Asia and the Pacific has burgeoned. Initially a cottage industry of a small epistemic community of scholars and practitioners (mostly economists) from the region (and Aus-
this area of study now incorporates a wide variety of scholars and practitioners. No longer simply the preserve of the economist, the study of regionalism has become increasingly multidisciplinary and increasingly comparative. The strength of the comparative and multidisciplinary analysis of regionalism in general and East Asian regionalism in particular is due in no small part to the increasing strength of international political economy (IPE) as a field of inquiry. In this context, the role of Peter Katzenstein has clearly been seminal.

Specifically, we can see his influence in his pioneering studies of small European states in the global political economy that were at the forefront of work in comparative political economy on the one hand and his theoretical contribution to theorizing in IPE on the other. There is an increasing tendency to see IPE, indeed theory building in international relations (IR) in general, as often polarized along transatlantic lines in which North American IPE is seen as positivist, rationalist, deductive, and quantitative (and therefore good)—and European scholarship as largely discursive, nonrationalist, inductive, and qualitative (and therefore flawed). In this context, Katzenstein’s centrality to, but difference in, US IPE/IR scholarship takes on beaconlike proportions for non-Americans. Katzenstein’s theoretical position, enunciated, for example, in his analysis of contemporary Asia Pacific security, and encapsulated in the concept of “analytical eclecticism” (2001–2002), might not win widespread acceptance in the generic struggle for paradigmatic parsimony. But it surely weakens the notion that this is purely a geographical distinction rather than a more serious, fundamental, and still for many contested, issue in the philosophy of the social sciences than those of higher scientific virtue are often prepared to concede. As I show in the next section of this short essay, Katzenstein has played an important role in bridging the often falsely fabricated bridges between traditional realist (and liberal) scholarship and emerging constructivist scholarship. Similarly, as the discussion of *A World of Regions* (*AWR*) in the last section of the essay shows, Katzenstein also practices what he preaches about the need for analytical eclecticism in the face of the nomothetic imperatives of disciplinary theorists on the one hand and the contextual imperatives of the regional specialist on the other.

Pertinent to this discussion, we can see this influence in his individual and collaborative work, which has played an increasingly important role in refining the theory and practice of regionalism in East Asia (1997, 2006). While not an original worker in this area, Katzenstein, in the matter of some ten to twelve years, has become one of its
most important theoretical thinkers. And in his recent major work, he has embedded the study of regions into a wider global context in the analysis of the relationship among Asia, Europe, and what he calls the “American imperium.” It is on this later corpus of work that I focus here. In it I offer a brief review of the state of theorizing about comparative and East Asian regionalism, with specific attention to what we might call Katzenstein’s value added. In so doing, I also ask what Katzenstein’s work offers us when taking a forward look at the theory and practice of regionalism in the early years of the twenty-first century. I argue that while Katzenstein is correct to focus on the centrality of the American imperium, his interpretation of the enduring strength of this imperium is in fact open to question.

The Theory and Practice of Regionalism

For much of the last quarter of the twentieth century, policymakers and scholars conceptualized regionalism with reference to Europe. There was one functional model—the Brussels model—with an emphasis on a secular economic progression over time from a free trade area, via a customs union, common market, and monetary union, to complete economic integration.\(^38\) This secular progression was underwritten by a mixture of intergovernmental dialogue and treaty revision that equated mature regionalism with the creation of supranational institutional bodies such as the European Commission, the European Parliament, and the European Court of Justice.

The strengths and weaknesses of such an approach are now well understood and need not be revisited here, save to note two things. First, this Eurocentric mental map of regionalism, whether viewed negatively or positively, loomed large throughout the 1980s and 1990s in thinking about regionalism in other parts of the world. Second, and by extension, it prejudiced most conclusions analysts and practitioners might have wanted to make about the emergence of a world order based on alternative forms of regional organization and cooperation. This was especially the case in East Asia where non-Asian analysts of the regional project were dismissive of any activity that advanced models of economic or security cooperation absent the European mental “map.”\(^39\) At the same time, and especially prior to the financial crises of the second half of the 1990s, the Brussels model, with its implicit assumptions of what the late Noordin Sopiee called “Cartesian legal formalism,” was resisted by Asian analysts-cum-practitioners.
For several reasons, of both a scholarly and practical nature, this Eurocentric, teleological form of reasoning about regionalism no longer carries much theoretical or practical policy weight. Yet conversely, and ironically, Asian resistance to “learning from Europe” is also lessening, for two reasons.40

First, from the European perspective, and notwithstanding the historical evidence of “sovereignty pooling” and the emergence of increasing “everyday” regulatory complexity in the European policy process,41 integration theory (on more than one occasion in the life of the European Community, we should note) clearly underestimated the pervasiveness of nationalist sentiment and a strong state preference for intergovernmental policymaking in Europe.

Second, by the end of the Cold War (especially the revised geopolitical security dynamics and structures that ensued), our increasingly embedded understandings of interdependence and the growth of globalization changed our understandings of the possibilities for enhanced cooperative transborder activity and the increasingly complex nature of interstate exchange relationships. The continued liberalization of global trade and the dramatic deregulation of global financial markets caused us to question the structure of economic relations founded on the premise of national territory. Both factors caused a rethinking about the economics of regionalism. The Balassian, four-stage model of regional integration that had been applied to the evolution of the Common Market42 was far too blunt an analytical instrument for the contemporary era. One-size-fits-all theories of regionalism would henceforth clearly not be tenable.

From an Asian perspective, changed thinking was brought about principally by the impact of the financial crises of 1997–1998. As is well understood, these crises proved to be a watershed. They provided a political reality check on a number of Asian assumptions about regional (and global) economic management that had been obscured during the heady emerging market, “Asian miracle” era of the decade preceding the crises. The most obvious lesson was the limited utility of Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) as an emergent mode of regional governance for the Asia-Pacific.43 While APEC was theoretically only a trade-led initiative, neither equipped nor intended to deal with financial crises, it was grossly overhyped, and the crises opened the way for clearer, less idealistic thinking about regionalism in East Asia.

Similarly, the much-vaunted Asian or Pacific consensus-based approaches to regional cooperation were also seen to be limited in the absence of any binding institutional structures at the East Asian level. However, discussions about regional governance structures that have taken
place since the crises—from the Chiang Mai initiative of 2001 to the first regional summit in November 2005—and whatever their long-term effectiveness may turn out to be, suggest a growing regional self-definition of East Asia as a viable economic space. The development of a discernable political voice and a need for a greater understanding of the importance of institutions as instruments of transaction cost reduction, learning, socialization, deal making, and—perhaps most significant—as a way to shape collective identity and make commitments more credible and compliance more likely are becoming increasingly important. In short, the discourse of regionalism in East Asia has changed quite dramatically in the years following the Asian financial crisis.

In addition to a growing interest in institutional theory in East Asia, other new analytical elements came into play more generally in the study of regionalism in the closing decade of the twentieth century. What we might call the constructivist turn in international relations provided scholars (and US scholars in particular) with the much-needed ability to deal with the importance of questions of identity in international relations and identity building as a dynamic factor in region building in particular. Regional forums for dialogue have increasingly needed to be seen as “social” venues, not merely capsules where rational state action takes place. The salience of the relationship between institutionalized interaction and the emergence of regional identities and interests was becoming increasingly recognized. Finally, there was also a growing awareness of the impact on regionalization of exogenous political (as well as economic) challenges emanating from the rapid growth of globalization as a political as well as economic phenomenon. It is here, in these new analytical elements, that the work of Peter Katzenstein is pivotal for the study of regionalism in East Asia. With his constructivist insights into regionalism and his understanding of the impact of the American imperium, Katzenstein gives both theoretical insight and empirical narrative to the key issues of identity and exogenous political influence on East Asian regionalism.

Katzenstein and the American Imperium and East Asia

The Roots of Hybrid Regionalism

Notwithstanding his early work on Europe, Katzenstein did not make the mistake of much early regional theorizing of working through European
He also clearly understood that the regional urge emerging in contemporary East Asia in the closing years of the twentieth century was something new. It was not simply the extension of national models of activity; it was also the emergence of “a truly hybrid form of regionalism” in which questions of national identities of the major players in the region (and all that an understanding of the complexity of national identity implies)—and their interaction with the region in toto—can lead to multiperspectival understandings of region—be it an understanding of region as institutionalized practice or region as a set of multiactor processes. And what Asian regional practice in the twenty-first century clearly tells us is that regional policy initiatives do not simply arise from rational spillover from one policy area to another. Rather, they are also the outcome of emerging senses of collective identity (no matter how thin) that frame the way in which policy elites respond to exogenous shocks.

The basic, and seminal, point that emerges from Katzenstein’s recent work is that understandings of what is happening in East Asia are not easily recognizable from earlier, traditional understandings of regionalism based on other, non-Asian regional experiences. This is no easy thing to grasp in a region where at various historical stages the key actors change and where we must now account for the activities of not only the United States and Japan but also China and, albeit to a lesser extent, India. What his recent work shows is one crucial dimension of the increasingly complex nature of regionalization in East Asia under conditions of globalization. This he calls “hybrid regionalism.” It emerges from the unintended roles of the major actors in the region. It does so for Katzenstein via the initial fusion of “Americanization” and “Japanization.” In this process, Japan mediates and “reworks” US cultural influence and geostrategic and commercial demands and influences over the rest of the region.

In addition, and without overstating the case, similar processes, although with different impacts, are in train through what he calls “Sinicization,” the impact of which (led by the strong role of Chinese entrepreneurialism in Southeast Asia especially) is to increasingly blur the distinctions one might have once made along national lines. Perhaps most importantly, the cumulative impact of these influences (for Katzenstein and his collaborator Takashi Shiraishi at least) is that it makes the individual national influences increasingly difficult, indeed impossible, to disaggregate. What we have is a new networked regionalism underpinned by global capitalism. These processes are reaping major changes on both the culture and political economy of East Asia with yet-to-be-worked-out consequences for an East Asian regional project.
These crucial sociocultural insights should not, of course, blind us to the extant fragility of East Asian regionalism when seen through political economy lenses. Industrial competitiveness in the region depends on the smooth functioning of what Richard Baldwin calls “factory Asia.”49 Neither regional institutional arrangements to ensure the mitigation of bilateral tensions nor World Trade Organization–style disciplines are in place. As Katzenstein knows only too well, despite the regionwide dialogues of the early twenty-first century, state governments, not regional institutional actors, remain the arbiters of East Asia’s regional financial and trade orders. National structures may change, but they also endure. A new regionalism may be emerging, but as yet, dramatic structural transformation from the national to the regional level has not occurred. A “regional cosmopolitan mainstream elite” sharing a set of common cultural understandings might be emerging within the region, albeit with national characteristics, and they are “laying the social foundations for a market-centered regionalization in East Asia.”50 At this stage, of course, the political implications of the emergence of this grouping remain undetermined; moreover, their significance, especially over issues of foreign policy and security, must also be understood within wider geopolitical contexts and understandings.

Regions and Global Politics: East Asia and the American Imperium

We have come to understand in recent years the increasingly complex (indeed Janus-faced) relationship between globalization and regionalization.51 What Katzenstein does in AWR is give us the most comprehensive aperçu to date on this relationship. This, it needs to be said, is not a modest enterprise. What the book effectively asks us to do is understand Asia and Europe through the lens of the American imperium. It is testament to Katzenstein’s sensitivity as a scholar, however, that he does so with only the slightest hint of an accompanying American intellectual imperium. Indeed he qualifies this early assumption by stressing that “regional comparison, linked to analysis of the global power and processes that connect them, offers a promising way to understand ‘how the world works’” (2005, ix). Indeed, one might suggest that constraint is implicit in the very use of the term imperium, which he seems to equate with non-territorial empire. The book plays to Katzenstein’s empirical strengths; the two regions he chooses—Asia and Europe (or, more precisely, Japanese-centered Asia and German-centered Europe)—are clearly the two he knows best. Moreover, I can think of few, if any, US-based political
scientists who would back up this approach by actually reading as widely outside the US literature as he does. He reads literature emanating from the regions he studies.

By focusing on the region as his unit of analysis, he contributes, along with that growing body of scholars who study regions, in giving strength to the practice as well as theory of regionalism and an increasingly regionalized world system. That he does so, in his judgment, is no bad thing.

They [regions] impose a desirable limitation on America’s expansive dynamism, rooted in comfortable co-existence of polities that the U.S. helped create rather than the risky confrontation with powerful adversaries that it seeks to contain or defeat. . . . For the compatibility between imperium and region provides a modicum of political order and a loose sense of shared moral purpose that permits political struggles over well-being and justice to be settled in national and local politics. (2005, ix)

My concern, for the purpose of argument, is whether Katzenstein might be offering us a historically constrained judgment. His analysis is certainly appropriate for much of the twentieth century; but does the judgment extend into the twenty-first century? Has that which motivated the United States changed with the change of centuries? Historically, the core effect of the American imperium, sometimes consciously but mostly unconsciously, has been to act, in a multiple set of ways, as a driver of regionalism in the post–World War II period generally and in the post–Cold War era specifically. The Cold War regional orders that saw Western Europe become a tightly defined economic and security community underwritten by what John Ikenberry has described as the politico-economic “institutional bargain” between the United States and Europe also saw East Asia become a bifurcated series of US-dominated hub-and-spokes relationships. In this era, the United States was the positive spur to region building in Western Europe and, for historically understandable reasons it must be added, a fierce opponent of any such regional project in East Asia. Indeed, we must contrast the manner in which US foreign policy in a Cold War context proactively supported the European project with the constraining role played in East Asia.

It can be said without too much exaggeration that since the end of the Cold War, the regional dialogues that have continued to evolve in East Asia have done so almost in spite of US support rather than with it. The United States might be a catalyst to region building in East Asia, but its role is as much that of “the other” as it is that of a constructive driver.
of regionalism. Its role as “the other” in the East Asian regional discourse can effectively be timed from the financial crisis of 1996–1997, and especially its opposition to the Japanese suggestion of an Asian Monetary Fund. It is in the period since then that the discussion over the future of regionalism in East Asia has proceeded in earnest. This discussion takes many forms and directions that cannot be rehearsed here. The key question left unresolved (inevitably) by Katzenstein is the future of the relationship between the United States and East Asia. As he rightly notes, the relationship between the United States and the two regions tells as much about the changing US role as it does about the two regions themselves. “Just as the American imperium is changing regions, they in turn are changing the imperium.”55

Although cautious in the way he phrases it, and without saying whether it is a good thing or not, it is possible to detect in the conclusion to AWR a concern for the future of the imperium. US policy responses, especially since September 11—and especially with Washington’s growing interest in the “securitization” and “bilateralization” of key elements of its economic relations56—reflect a trend counter to that which prevailed during the time when the American imperium had played a more positive role in both Asia and Europe. In part this can be explained by the changes in the economic relationship between the United States and East Asia, especially the degree to which that relationship has become less asymmetrical since the early 1980s.57 As a consequence, the ability of the United States to set the regional agenda is becoming less convincing than at any time in the last two decades. As such, the likelihood that it will actively support greater institutional cooperation in the region should not be taken for granted. It has not been lost in Washington policy circles that closer regional economic cooperation could have the capacity to develop in a way that excludes the United States.58

Of course, improved East Asian aggregate economic performance does not axiomatically find its way into enhanced political leverage over the United States, given that the region does not formulate policy toward the United States on the basis of an “East Asian” interest or via institutionalized policymaking machinery capable of reflecting such an aggregate interest. Decisionmaking resides firmly at the level of the constituent states, not at the level of the wider regional collective. In this context, the agenda-setting abilities of the United States will for years to come continue to far outweigh those of any single East Asian state individually, even given the probability of some enhanced cooperative decisionmaking emerging in the region. For East Asia to bring
about a closure of the asymmetry in decisionmaking processes with the United States to accompany the declining gap in material capability, it needs to enhance its collective decisionmaking capabilities. For this to occur, leadership endogenous to the region needs to strengthen. How this might be achieved is, of course, the single most important regional policy issue for the future.

In this context, how the relationship between China and the rest of the region plays out in the long run is the key to security, cooperation, and institution building in East Asia. Katzenstein reflects only obliquely in AWR on the role that China will play and the impact that it, in its relationships with both the United States and Japan, will have on the prospects for a stable enhanced economic and political cooperation in the region. Unlike either Germany in Europe or Japan in East Asia (the focus of AWR), China has not been a partner in the imperium. How it accommodates to the region and how the region accommodates to it are as, if not more, important for any successful regional project in East Asia as is the role of the United States. For most of the second half of the twentieth century, both China and Japan, for their own particular historical reasons, were effectively denied regional leadership ambitions. But in the early twenty-first century, the regional strategic architecture is undergoing a process of change requiring them both to think positively about the leadership issue in a way they have not done in the past. The implications of this for the American imperium we are only just beginning to ponder. Could this perhaps be Katzenstein’s next project?

In Search of an East Asian Region: Beyond Network Power

John Ravenhill

Over the last fifteen years, Peter Katzenstein has been wrestling with how best to conceptualize the evolution of regionalism in Asia and Europe within a context of American hegemony (or “imperium” in Katzenstein’s terminology). A World of Regions is the culmination of this work. It is a landmark study in comparative regionalism that not only affords insight into the divergent experiences of Europe and Asia but also, as Katzenstein tentatively explores in the concluding chapter, provides a framework that can be applied productively to examine other regional
arrangements. In an era when preoccupation with method frequently triumphs over substance, the book is a powerful affirmation and demonstration of the value of “multidisciplinary, area-based” knowledge in the study of international relations (2005).

Very few authors have the knowledge of more than one geographical region required for an in-depth comparative study of the type presented in *A World of Regions*. The book not only pulls together (and substantially moves beyond) the previous work that Katzenstein (and his collaborators in a number of edited collections) have completed on Asian regionalism, but also demonstrates the author’s voracious appetite for literatures that span the economic, cultural, and strategic dimensions of international relations. Asides in the book range from comments on Harry Potter to the design of the Scandinavian embassies in Berlin. The list of references runs close to forty pages of close-set type.

Katzenstein sets out to restore regions as significant units of analysis in the study of contemporary international relations. The comparative study of regionalism has not fared well since Ernst Haas famously proclaimed the obsolescence of regional integration theory in the mid-1970s. While scholars have developed a rich literature on regionalism in Europe (sparked in part by a revival of neofunctionalism and responses by critics of this approach), the literature on Asian regionalism, with few exceptions—such as constructivist approaches to Asian identity—is relatively impoverished.

Several factors underlie the weakness of this literature. Perhaps most significant is that for Asian regionalism, conceived in terms of intergovernmental collaboration, “there is no there there.” The central task for students of Asian (or more broadly Asia Pacific) regionalism has typically been to explain the weakness of intergovernmental institutions. But one suspects that another reason for the disappointing quality of much of the literature on Asian regionalism is that many of the contributors to its study, especially those from Asian countries, are themselves participants in regional Track II processes and feel compelled to publicly defend the Association of Southeast Asian Nations—the “ASEAN way.” And with relatively little societal input into intergovernmental collaboration in Asia, the domestic politics of regionalism are far less interesting for political scientists than are those in Europe. The literature on regionalization, defined as a process of deepening economic integration within a geographical region, which Katzenstein draws on extensively in his analysis of Asian regionalism, is—like its subject matter—generally much more vibrant than that dealing with Asian intergovernmental collaboration.
In making his case for the significance of regions in contemporary international relations, Katzenstein is explicit in acknowledging his debts to earlier scholars of regionalism. The early comparative work of neo-functionalists is recognized; Katzenstein’s emphasis on the significance of core states within a region, moreover, is very much in the Deutschian tradition.66 The novelty of Katzenstein’s approach comes from his sophisticated treatment of the place of regions within a world dominated by an American imperium and buffeted by forces of globalization and internationalization.67 Here the key concept—which moves beyond Katzenstein’s own previous work as well as that of other students of regionalism—is porousness: the argument that regions “are made porous by both global and international processes and also by a variety of vertical relations linking them to other political units” (2005, 22).

For Katzenstein, US action in the 1940s was “crucial in bringing about the regional institutional orders that have characterized Asia and Europe for the last half century” (2005, 43). US preference for multilateralism in Europe and for bilateralism in Asia fundamentally shaped subsequent patterns of regional interaction. It explains the weakness of formal regional institutions in Asia. Whereas regionalism in Europe went on to be characterized by a distinctive legal order that is “embedded in a variety of political institutions that link countries together in a European polity,” regionalism in Asia was predominantly shaped by markets that were typically organized through ethnic networks (2005, 43). For Katzenstein, Asia illustrates “the imagined, informal, and economic” aspects of regionalism (2005, 36). Its core components are Japanese production networks organized jointly by government and business, and the informal networks of overseas Chinese.

Unavoidably, given the breadth of the topic, a single volume that covers regionalism in Asia and Europe will be incomplete, irrespective of how eclectic the approach adopted. Like all good books, A World of Regions will stimulate debate among readers; much of this will surely focus on the primacy that Katzenstein accords to the United States and to Japan in shaping Asian regionalism. Such assertions will inevitably invite criticism from other parts of the region—reflected, for instance, in Amitav Acharya’s contribution to this roundtable. In the remainder of these comments, I suggest that Katzenstein’s analysis at times both overstates and understates the role of the United States and Japan in shaping Asian regionalism. Moreover, Katzenstein’s Japan-centric approach arguably is more useful in explaining the contours of Asian regionalism in the first half of the 1990s than in identifying the most significant developments and challenges facing Asian regionalism today.
Consider first the failure of multilateralism to develop in Asia in the period after World War II. This failure surely was significantly overdetermined. While Katzenstein has unearthed some fascinating material that shows a marked contrast between the attitudes of US policymakers toward Asia versus Europe, it is difficult to imagine how a multilateral arrangement in Asia could have materialized even if the United States had pushed for one. Most of Southeast Asia was still under colonial rule; Korea and Taiwan had only recently been liberated from Japanese colonialism and were about to be embroiled in civil wars.

If the significance of the US role in explaining why Asian multilateralism did not develop in the early postwar years is overstated, that of Japan in failing to successfully foster it in the following four decades receives surprisingly little attention. Again, the absence of multilateral intergovernmental collaboration in Asia was overdetermined—and even the most astute diplomacy by the Japanese government would have had great difficulty in bringing it about. But Tokyo did little to overcome suspicions in other parts of the region of Japan’s power and purpose. Most fundamentally, Japan maintained an ambivalent attitude to whether it was actually part of Asia, an attitude that led to its diplomacy being perceived as patronizing by other countries in the region, and to proposed regional blueprints from Tokyo that typically embraced the industrialized economies of the Pacific Rim as well as its Northeast and Southeast Asian neighbors.

Reinforcing these perceptions of Japanese arrogance, of course, was Tokyo’s failure to provide an unequivocal apology for its wartime behavior, a festering sore in relations with its neighbors. And Japan’s behavior in the economic realm did little to convince others of Tokyo’s good intentions. The relatively “closed” character of Japanese production networks that Katzenstein discusses provided little opportunity for technology transfer. Japan’s seemingly generous foreign aid program appeared to be designed as much to further the interests of Japanese companies as those of recipient countries. The unwillingness of Japan to open its markets to exports from countries within the region, save for raw materials, and Japan’s reluctance to internationalize use of the yen (until the late 1990s, by which time it was far too late) further impeded the development of a regional economic order. And the “flying geese” analogy, which in Kaname Akamatsu’s original dialectical formulation anticipated latecomers catching up with early industrializing economies, was deployed by Japanese students of the regional economy in a manner to suggest that a natural hierarchical order existed in which Japan would be the perpetual lead goose.
In contrast, when Katzenstein turns to the discussion of production networks, the role of Japanese networks arguably is overstated, while US networks receive very little attention. If indeed Japanese production networks, as they are described in *A World of Regions*, were the defining characteristic of Asian regionalism (together with those of the overseas Chinese), then this was the case for a very limited period of time—little more than the decade after the Plaza Accord. Before the accord, the limited Japanese investment in Southeast Asia was aimed either at extracting raw materials or at import-substituting manufacturing. In the decade after the accord, as Katzenstein notes, substantial Japanese investment did take place in Southeast Asia (although these economies were still relatively minor recipients of Japanese foreign direct investment [FDI] compared with North America, again testimony to the forces of globalization as well as of regionalization). In the same period, Japanese car companies lobbied hard for ASEAN to implement provisions that would enable them to rationalize their production facilities across Southeast Asia. Japanese networks were hierarchical and relatively closed.

But even at this time, there were alternatives to Japanese networks—not just those of the overseas Chinese, which Katzenstein discusses, but those organized by US companies. This was particularly the case in Southeast Asia, given the prominent investments by US electronics companies in the region. The flow of components across regional borders within US-controlled networks made a significant contribution to the regionalization of trade. In other sectors, such as clothing and footwear, US buyer-led networks provided technology, managerial expertise, and, most critically, access to markets that facilitated rapid economic growth in Korea, Taiwan, and, more recently, China. By overemphasizing the significance of Japanese networks, Katzenstein understates the porosity of the region.

Katzenstein is clearly aware of the changes in Japanese production networks that have occurred since the mid-1990s, evident in his most recent book on Japan and the Asian region where he discusses the “hollowing out” of Japan’s political and social models. Yet *A World of Regions* includes scant reference to the erosion of the predominant position that Japanese producers enjoyed in the 1990s, which now finds them caught in a pincer movement between US companies, which have displaced them from the technological edge in major sectors of electronics, and new rivals from Korea, Taiwan, and China. The response of Japanese companies to the new challenges has not been uniform—either within different divisions of the same major electronics producer.
or across different companies within the same sector.\textsuperscript{76} But the overall trend has been toward an opening up of networks, a greater dependence on contract manufacturers for low-end products, and a new willingness to engage in transborder collaboration for particularly risky capital-intensive research and development (R&D) projects.

The other leg of Katzenstein’s network regionalism—the overseas Chinese—is also problematic if it is elevated to the status of being a defining element of Asian “regionalism.” To be sure, investment from Hong Kong and Taiwan has played an important role in China’s rapid economic growth since its economic opening (accounting for close to one half of China’s total FDI inflows, more if funds channeled through offshore tax havens are included). But does this amount to much more than a reintegration of the Chinese economy? The economic linkages between China and Southeast Asian economies are less tangible and, as Wang Gungwu, the preeminent scholar of the overseas Chinese—or Chinese overseas as he prefers to call them—has always emphasized, are driven entirely by the profit motive.\textsuperscript{77} Treatments of the overseas Chinese sometimes drift toward an essentialist approach that fails to reflect on how the very notion of what it means to be Chinese has increasingly been contested, particularly in Southeast Asia. Localization of identity among the “Chinese” in individual countries is frequently accompanied by deep suspicion toward business communities in other parts of the Chinese “diaspora.”\textsuperscript{78} The relationship between economic, cultural, and political linkages among the Chinese overseas has always been a particularly contentious issue: one cannot assume that supposed cultural affinities will necessarily facilitate business interactions.\textsuperscript{79}

If, as Katzenstein suggests, East Asian regionalism is primarily defined by Japanese production networks and by relations among the overseas Chinese, then we have a very weak regionalism indeed.

What is the relationship among networks, state action, and other dimensions of regionalism? How are evolutions in one dimension affecting change in others in contemporary Asia? Beyond the discussion of the nexus between the Japanese state and corporate networks, \textit{A World of Regions} offers little on this topic. The extent to which the spread and effectiveness of production networks in East Asia depended on state action through the creation of export-processing zones or duty drawback arrangements (both in Southeast Asia and then in China), thereby creating the functional equivalent of a free trade area for components, is largely unexplored. So, too, is the relationship between networks and the evolution of intergovernmental collaboration on trade—first in Asia-
Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), more recently in the proliferation of bilateral trade agreements involving countries of the region. Is Asian intergovernmental collaboration on trade providing some vindication of neofunctionalist arguments? Or does Asian economic collaboration continue to be government driven, as many critics have suggested, often directed primarily toward securing noneconomic objectives and largely disconnected from business interests?

One thing is sure: the characteristics of the production networks operating across Asia created a particular form of regional economy. Given that only a very small percentage of the output of Japanese subsidiaries in Southeast Asia, at least until the late 1990s, was directed to “reverse exports” to Japan, the type of regionalization of trade that Japanese networks fostered was very different from that which emerged in Europe. The trade triangles that emerged after the Plaza Accord, in which components from Japan, Korea, and Taiwan were assembled elsewhere in Asia for finished products destined particularly for the US market, enhanced rather than diminished the US significance for the region. US networks further reinforced the extraregional orientation of the final goods manufactured in Asian production networks. Despite the growth of trade within East Asia, the share of the total exports of East Asian economies that goes to other parts of the East Asian “region” still lags very substantially behind that in Western Europe (and indeed of the North American Free Trade Agreement, NAFTA). The decade since the financial crisis has seen little change in the overall dependence of East Asia on the US market, merely a reorientation of networks in which China has become the principal source of finished goods, displacing those previously assembled in Japan, Korea, or Taiwan (and to a lesser extent ASEAN). Production networks continue to underwrite the “open regionalism” or porousness of the Asian region.

Perhaps the omission that readers will find most curious in A World of Regions is the lack of discussion of the relative decline of Japan’s economic position in the region and of the rise of China. Japan’s “lost decade” had significant consequences for the role of Japanese production networks in other parts of East Asia. Although Japan retained its role as the largest aid donor in most other Asian countries, it otherwise shrank in significance as an economic partner for its regional neighbors. In ASEAN economies collectively, the single most important source of FDI inflows in the first half of the current decade was the European Union (EU), alone accounting for more than one quarter of total flows, more than three times the share of Japan. The United States was
the second most important source, contributing 15 percent of total flows.\textsuperscript{81} The EU also overtook Japan as a market for ASEAN exports—despite the absence of any preferential trade agreement between the EU and ASEAN economies.

Meanwhile, China increasingly cast an economic shadow over the region. Many readers will find Katzenstein’s arguments for why he gave relatively little attention to China’s role in the region to be unpersuasive—at least insofar as the objective is to understand the dynamics of contemporary Asian regionalism (2005, 36–37). China has already surpassed Japan as the largest single trading partner within Asia, in its holdings of foreign exchange, in its stocks of inward FDI, and as the world’s second largest automobile market after the United States. Although Japan may retain a significant lead in technologies, China is now the third most important location for overseas R\&D subsidiaries behind the United States and the United Kingdom; couple these facilities with the impressive technological progress made by domestic companies and the gap with Japan is likely to narrow rapidly.

Equally significant for Asian regionalism, Beijing has displayed a deft touch in regional diplomacy that has been almost entirely lacking in Tokyo’s relations with its neighborhood. China’s offer of a free trade agreement to ASEAN was a brilliant diplomatic move, which successfully put Tokyo on the defensive, an effective “wedge issue” given the seeming inability of Japanese governments to successfully address the domestic agricultural protectionism issue. China’s “peaceful development” has already produced fascinating new configurations of interests within Asian regionalism, not least the increasing contestation over how the region should be constituted (ASEAN+3; East Asia + India + Oceania, or Asia Pacific?).

In understanding the dynamics of contemporary Asian regionalism, it is not a matter of focusing on China to the exclusion of Japan. Katzenstein is, of course, correct in arguing in his most recent publication on Japan’s relations with Asia that it would be foolish to declare “Japan for all intents and purposes irrelevant.”\textsuperscript{82} It may be that we are witnessing a Japanese renaissance in economic as well as security spheres.\textsuperscript{83} Given the significance of Japan’s defense ties with the United States, Japan will be a core state in the East Asian region for the foreseeable future. But the rise of China has already produced dramatically different patterns of relations in East Asian regionalism. The title of Katzenstein’s most recent book, Beyond Japan, points the way forward for the future analysis of Asian regionalism.
A n author should count himself very lucky when meeting one sympa-
thetic, knowledgeable, and smart critic. I am an author lucky
four times over. Amitav Acharya, Vinod Aggarwal and Min Gyo Koo,
Richard Higgott, and John Ravenhill have written extremely thoughtful,
sympathetic, and probing reviews of *A World of Regions (AWR)*. Like the
old rabbi listening to divergent opinions voiced on a contestable issue, I
found myself nodding in agreement and saying four times “this is true.”
Recognizing that on some key points the reviewers are in sharp disagree-
ment with one another, I nodded once more and muttered “this is true
too.” The mixture of agreement and disagreement among my reviewers
as well as the strength and vigor of their views invites a brief response—
in the interest of furthering debate and deepening understanding rather
than defending entrenched intellectual positions. Before engaging three
major points that this forum raises (analytical eclecticism, the American
imperium, and Japan and Germany as regional core states), it may be
helpful to review briefly the main arguments of *AWR*.85

**Main Arguments**

At the broadest level, this book offers a conceptualization of world poli-
tics. I write quite deliberately “world” rather than “international” or
“global” politics. The book explores international and global arguments
against data drawn from the field of Asian and European affairs. Contrary
to the view of those who see international politics contested by nation-
states and those who see globalization reconfiguring nation-states into
new actors, *AWR* establishes striking regional commonalities that differ-
entiate Asian from European politics in their institutional form, type of
identity, internal structure, and characteristic political practices. Furth-
ermore, the book reports its findings for cases that are easy ones for inter-
nationalization theory (internal and external security, as well as cultural
diplomacy) and globalization theory (technology and production, as well
as popular culture).86

Undercutting the expected divergence among a large number of
nation-states and the stipulated convergence of a globalizing world,
Asia and Europe have regionally specific, systematically different patterns of politics and policies that do not vary across issues. To claim superiority, well-formulated rival explanations such as realism and liberalism should do at least as well as AWR. Some variants of realism and liberalism may claim to be analytically more powerful than the argument I advance in AWR. But as long as these variants focus only on their favorite issue domain—security for realism, economics for liberalism—the broader applicability of the regional argument proposed in AWR, at a minimum, leaves unresolved the question of which of the different perspectives is outperforming the others. Only after realists and liberals have addressed, respectively, economic and security issues and also incorporated cultural issues in their analyses could one assess with some confidence any claim they may lay to their superior explanatory power. In any event, regional commonalities across diverse policy issues are the most important substantive finding of AWR.

AWR offers a conceptualization of world politics that challenges widely accepted international and global perspectives. However, far from rejecting internationalization and globalization theories, AWR focuses on the role of core regional states and on the porosity of regions brought about by processes of internationalization and globalization. A compelling regional argument incorporates rather than neglects international and global factors.

Finally, porousness and core states in a regional world are linked closely to an American imperium that mixes territorial and nonterritorial power, as reflected in the international and global processes that the United States has spawned and fostered. While a regional perspective suggests a horizontal image of the world, the concept of imperium draws our attention to the importance of vertical ties—between regions and core states, between regions and subregions, and between core states and the United States. The American imperium is not only an actor that shapes the world. It is also a system that reshapes America.

**Analytical Eclecticism**

Many of the reviewers notice the book’s self-conscious analytical eclecticism. While Aggarwal and Koo are openly critical of AWR’s intellectual stance, Richard Higgott is deeply appreciative. The complexity and richness of the empirical material I had to deal with while writing AWR helped crystallize my thinking and furthered my collaboration with Nobuo Okawara and, especially, Rudra Sil. What is analytical eclecticism?
First and foremost it is an attack on incompleteness. Not known as a proponent of muddled thinking, Kenneth Waltz, in his most celebrated book, observed long ago that “the prescriptions directly derived from a single image are incomplete because they are based upon partial analyses. The partial quality of each image sets up a tension that drives one toward inclusion of the other.” Analytical eclecticism takes components of different research traditions and combines them to produce new analytical frameworks. Thus, operates with three definitions of regions—material, ideational, and behavioral—drawn from three different research traditions and works with all of them as it analyzes Asia’s and Europe’s different regional orders.

Analytical eclecticism subscribes to a pragmatist view of the world, which it finds more attractive and plausible than positivism (in its various “pre-” and “post-” manifestations). Positivism views objective truth as being accessed through value-free concepts and replicable methods in a cumulative process reflecting continuous scientific progress. In light of the sharp disagreements among positivists in the social sciences about which questions are important, what methods are adequate, how to evaluate scholarship, and how to define and recognize scientific progress in the analysis of international relations, positivist notions of science may well be unobtainable. Pragmatism offers a plausible alternative that is skeptical of, but not as a matter of principle in contradiction to, positivism.

Far from being opposed to them, analytical eclecticism depends on the development of alternative research traditions. Such traditions serve many good purposes, including avoiding never-ending debates about metatheory, providing a common theoretical vocabulary and common knowledge, offering common standards for evaluation and a recognizable professional identity to scholars, and encouraging progress in one research tradition that finds itself in competition with others. Beyond a certain point, however, such research traditions have clear costs for the entire discipline of international relations. They compartmentalize knowledge, overlook questions and causal mechanisms that do not fit comfortably into their analytical priors, and often lead to a degree of specialization that makes academic scholarship irrelevant to the concerns of a broader policy community.

Grounded in pragmatism, analytical eclecticism is designed to help identify and solve problems that reflect the complexity of issues facing actors in world politics. The analysis of Japan and Germany as core states in Asia and Europe, for example, invites an exploration of the issue of how to create a possible core state in the Middle East. In broadening
the empirical focus of AWR beyond Asia and Europe to incorporate Latin America, South Asia, Africa, and the Middle East. Chapter 7 provides such an analysis.

Because it does not enable us to rule out systematically certain outcomes or to explore alternative scenarios based on a falsifiable set of variables, for Aggarwal and Koo, analytical eclecticism is ad hoc reasoning that poses a barrier to systematic inquiry, greater knowledge accumulation, and advances in the understanding of regional trends. Richard Higgott begs to differ. He sees analytical eclecticism as a way of keeping open debates on contested issues in the philosophy of social science. And with AWR he supports the search for area-based knowledge and contingent generalization rather than toeing the lines of either the nomothetic imperatives of disciplinary theorists or the contextual imperatives of regional specialists.

Contra Aggarwal and Koo, analytical eclecticism does not aim at a theoretical synthesis of existing research traditions and the creation of a new master theory that aims at addressing multiple problems in a single framework. Quite the opposite is true. Analytical eclecticism focuses on specific problems that it seeks to solve by examining a broad range of plausible causal mechanisms drawn from competing research traditions. Analytical eclecticism thus can be helpful in detaching particular concepts, causal mechanisms, explanations, and prescriptions from particular research traditions and combining them in novel frameworks to capture a more nuanced understanding of a complex world. The potential benefits of analytical eclecticism are clear: more experimentation, better communication, and the promise of a consensus that may capture the attention of policymakers. It would be foolish, however, to disregard the risks—the absence of what Imre Lakatos calls a “protective belt,” inviting criticism from a broader range of observers, a blurred professional identity, and the intellectual demand of acquiring the skill to engage in multilingual conversations with different research traditions. On balance, though, for the field of international relations as a whole, the prevalence of research traditions over analytical eclecticism makes the cost of intellectual rigidity loom much larger than the risk of intellectual experimentation. As for specific books, reviewers and readers will undoubtedly be able to sort out good work from bad, guided by Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart’s well-tested maxim for pornography: they will know it when they read it.

If not analytical eclecticism then what? Aggarwal and Koo work in a rationalist framework. In the interest of simplicity, such a framework takes actor interests as given. Aggarwal and Koo’s preferred approach,
they claim, “may” be better in providing us with a more precise understanding of contingent outcomes. Or it may not. Like much of the rationalist analysis of regionalism that I have found wanting for a comprehensive analysis, AWR offers a clear target; and it sets the bar at a certain height. Only future research will tell whether the simplifications that Aggarwal and Koo are willing to make will indeed succeed in transforming “may” into “will.”

Acharya inquires into the relevance of theories derived from the European experience to illuminate other parts of the world. AWR fully agrees with his insistence on avoiding Eurocentrism, on taking the European version of regionalism as the model by which to judge regionalism in other parts of the world. I, for one, do not think that there are “Asian” or “European” variables or models. Properly conceived, our theoretical constructs and methods should be able to illuminate and explain aspects of social and political life irrespective of where we apply them. Doing so may require, however, some sensitivity and a willingness to adapt one’s conceptual framework. The distinction between state and society, for example, developed against the deep historical background of European history as shaped by Roman public law cannot simply be transposed to the Asian regional order. And whether and how Western concepts of sovereignty have been imported and are functioning in Asia should be a matter of inquiry rather than an axiom of analysis. Area-based knowledge, AWR argues, is a verdant middle ground that draws its waters from different sources. Acharya’s own work is a model of combining analytical rigor with contextual knowledge.

*Imperium*

The end of the Cold War shifted the dynamics of world politics in ways that were not well captured by realist or liberal explanations. With two groups of colleagues, I thus set out in the early 1990s to explore the dynamics of European and Asian regionalism. Toward the end of those projects I was left with so many interesting and unresolved puzzles that I decided to continue work on my own. As the contributors to this roundtable have noted, AWR builds on, refines, and modifies research spanning more than a decade.

While I was fully absorbed trying to master a large volume of material on Europe and Asia, the role of the United States always lurked in the background. My close friend and editor Roger Haydon told me early on in the process of writing AWR that I would not be able to finish this
book without a systematic incorporation of the role the United States plays in a world of regions. Understanding the distinctiveness of US power and working out the political links between different world regions and the United States became an all-consuming task in the late stages of the project.

AWR stresses the important role of US foreign policy in the creation of two different types of links: bilateral ones with Asia and multilateral ones with Europe. The power of the American imperium in constituting regions has both traditional territorial and novel nonterritorial aspects. And it is conditioned by the character of the region it engages; the institutionalization of politics in different world regions has a pervasive influence on how the region will interact with the United States.

For most Americans, the United States radiates power outward, trying to remake the world in its own image. And to some extent it does. Yet, often overlooked by Americans and central to the argument developed in AWR is the incontrovertible fact that the world kicks back. I call this process of interaction between porous regions and the American imperium two-way Americanization. The case studies identify three different mechanisms: cross-fertilization in popular culture, co-evolution in technology and imitation, and blowback in security affairs. I thus disagree with Acharya’s argument that the interaction between blowback and US unilateralism is the only pattern of interaction. Imperium and regions interact. Just as the United States is trying to remake the world in its own image, so is the world remaking the United States, to the consternation of many Americans who are still caught in the mistaken belief that regions are moving only around an American sun that warms them but that they cannot touch. The admittedly limited empirical basis of AWR suggests a more variegated pattern. Future studies are likely to add a more detailed and accurate picture of those interactions than I was able to convey.

That said, Higgott asks—and in different parts of their reflections, comments, and critiques, Aggarwal and Koo, Acharya, and Ravenhill concur—whether the analysis of AWR is historically specific to the second half of the twentieth century. He suggests that developments since the 1997–1998 Asian financial crisis are pointing to a dynamic Asian regionalism that is being transformed. Like all books, AWR is to some extent shaped by the historical moment in which it was written. The effects of the Asian financial crisis are surely important for the future evolution of Asian regionalism; and so are, less directly, the deep flaws in the foreign policy strategy that George W. Bush adopted after Sep-
tember 11. But my reading of the historical record differs from Hig- gott’s. Against the background of a surprisingly successful US diplo- macy to engage China, I see the very circumscribed efforts of building an Asia-specific financial architecture and the intensification of Asian dialogues as important though less than transformative.

Since 2001, the United States has been quite successful in prompt- ing China to assume a growing leadership role in East Asia—not against the wishes of the United States but with its active support. To be certain, the US government opposes any diplomatic initiatives that seek to exclude the United States from East Asia; and it watches with suspicion the upgrading of China’s military capabilities (while pushing ahead with the upgrading of its own). But even at the height of unilat- eralist rhetoric, the US government was actively supportive of and en- gaged in new multilateral ventures—for example, in the field of energy. Furthermore, the United States is tied to China in bilateral dialogues that span a broad range of issues and that reach deeper into the middle levels of the bureaucracy than has ever before been true. More broadly, at the outset of the twenty-first century, US bilateral relations with China, India, and Japan are by historical and comparative standards ex- cellent. In sharp contrast to the rhetoric and policies that the United States has adhered to in other world regions, US foreign policy in Asia is deftly navigating the currents between imperium and region. In ac- commodating Asia in the American imperium, US diplomacy is slow- ing whatever tendencies toward transformation that may exist.

Core States and Regional Orders

Core states play a crucial role in linking Asia and Europe to America. AWR focuses on Germany and Japan as playing that role and argues that for historical reasons no other world region has similarly situated core states. Germany and Japan challenged the Anglo-American world order in the first half of the twentieth century and, after suffering dis- astrous defeats, became client and then supporter states in the Ameri- can imperium. Core states are enmeshed in the institutional regional order while also having special links with the United States. Rather than focusing on the fact, as does Acharya, that the core state of a re- gion may be subject to challenges from its regional peers, AWR seeks to demonstrate that core state and regional peers are bound together in relations that create an institutional order that normalizes their inter-
actions and makes “challenges” the exception, not the rule. In short, core states are indispensable links between imperium and region.

In its concrete application, this argument elicited much critical comment both before and after the publication of _AWR_. Specialists focusing on the politics of other regional powers—such as China, France, Britain, and Korea—often object to the singling out of Germany and Japan as core states. Yet, core states differ from regional pivots. _AWR_ makes a historically specific rather than a structurally general argument. It identifies Japan and Germany as core states not because of their size and power but because of their specific historical experience and evolution in the Anglo-American imperium. All regions have regional pivots that link the region to the imperium. But only Asia and Europe have core states, a politically consequential fact. The declining importance in Japanese production networks and the growing importance of China, which, respectively, John Ravenhill and Richard Higgott are very correct in pointing to, take nothing away from the political significance of Japan’s and Germany’s specific regional role.

This is not to deny that as history changes, so may the character and standing of these two core states. Japan and Germany are increasingly removed in time, if not in memory, from their traumatic national defeats. And as the character of the American imperium experiences its own changes, they are unavoidably repositioned in the matrix of Asian and European politics. There exists thus no reason why the role of these regional core states could not be filled by others. If Germany were to be submerged totally in a European polity (which seems unlikely) and if Japan’s GDP were surpassed, eventually, by China’s (which seems more likely), together with other historical changes affecting Asia, Europe, and the United States, this might eventually transform the role of these two core states. And changing historical conditions might transform other regional pivots into core states. In the case of France and China, for example, the magnitude of such changes is hard to fathom but would have to be very substantial. These two states are crucial pivots. But for reasons of history it is hard to imagine how they could replace Germany and Japan anytime soon as Asia’s and Europe’s core states.

**What Next?**

In his trenchant review, Richard Higgott quite properly asks “what next?” Understanding the regional dynamics of world politics is, I
think, a research program that can draw on excellent work done at the intersection of comparative and international studies. Future work may well focus more on the processes that link regions to each other and to the American imperium. Processes of internationalization and globalization need to be specified more precisely in terms of Americanization, Japanization, Sinicization, Europeanization, and Islamicization, and the mechanisms that operate in these processes need to be isolated. With its analysis of two-way Americanization and the characterizations of mechanisms such as cross-fertilization, coevolution, and blowback, AWR has begun no more than a tentative move in that direction.

One specific thing we know too little about is the content of the values that are being processed. One of the striking facts of this forum is that none of my commentators even mentions the chapter on cultural diplomacy and popular culture, which is, with economics and security, one of the three issue areas discussed in AWR. Values and value conflicts are reflected in a variety of issue domains. Besides the two I explored in AWR, rights and religion are also of growing importance in world politics. Value conflicts in world politics once again deserve our increased attention.

The dynamics of a world of regions are unsettled by developments in regions and by developments in the United States. In this forum, my reviewers have focused quite properly and for understandable reasons on developments in Asia. The failed policies of the Bush administration highlight the need to understand better the dynamics of the United States. Its multiple traditions are not well captured by the liberal-realist synthesis that is embraced by most students of US foreign policy. Woodrow Wilson was a liberal deeply convinced of the rightness of racial hierarchy at home and abroad. And realist foreign policy after World War II had a deep religious strain, largely forgotten today. Political neoconservatism provided the guiding doctrine for US foreign policy in recent years. It draws on America’s multiple political traditions. How these traditions combine and produce specific value configurations that infuse global and international processes is an important next step for a better understanding of politics in a world of regions.

Peter J. Katzenstein is the Walter S. Carpenter Jr. Professor of International Studies at Cornell University. His work addresses issues of political economy, security, and culture in world politics. His current research interests focus on the politics of civilizational states on questions of public diplomacy, law, religion,

Vinod K. Aggarwal is professor of political science, affiliated professor of business and public policy in the Haas School of Business, and director of the Berkeley Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Study Center (BASC) at the University of California, Berkeley. He is also editor-in-chief of Business and Politics. His recent books include Bilateral Trade Agreements in the Asia Pacific (2006, coedited with Shujiro Urata) and Asia’s New Institutional Architecture: Evolving Structures for Managing Trade, Financial, and Security Relations (2007, coedited with Min Gyo Koo).

Min Gyo Koo is assistant professor of public administration at Yonsei University, Seoul, Korea. He has published his research in a wide range of journals, including Pacific Review, Pacific Affairs, and European Journal of East Asia Studies. In addition, he is revising for publication his dissertation, Scramble for the Rocks: The Disputes over the Dokdo/Takeshima, Senkaku/Diaoyu, and Paracel and Spratly Islands.

Amitav Acharya is professor of global governance and director of the Governance Research Centre at the Department of Politics at Bristol University. His articles have appeared in numerous journals, including International Security, International Organization, Journal of Peace Research, and Political Studies. Among his academic books, his most recent coedited books include Reassessing Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (2007) and Crafting Cooperation: Regional International Institutions in Comparative Perspective (2007).

Richard Higgott is pro-vice chancellor and professor of politics and international studies at the University of Warwick. He is director of a European Commission Framework 6 Network of Excellence on Global Governance, Regulation, and Regionalization and has edited the journal The Pacific Review since 1995.

John Ravenhill is professor of international relations at the Australian National University. He was the founding editor of the Cambridge Asia-Pacific Studies series for Cambridge University Press. His recent books include Global Political Economy (2005), APEC and the Construction of Pacific Rim Regionalism (2001), and The Asian Financial Crises and the Architecture of Global Finance (2000). His articles have appeared in numerous journals, including International Organization and World Politics.
Notes


2. From the perspective of many analysts, divisions became the norm rather than the exception in East Asia. Southeast Asia has been divided along ethnic, religious, and ideological lines for decades. Northeast Asia remains equally separated as a result of Japanese colonialism and Cold War confrontation. And more generally, conventional analysis separated South and Central Asia from East Asia. Even Katzenstein uses “Asia” as shorthand for East Asia (1997, 1). In his 2005 work, however, Katzenstein more explicitly and carefully explores the construction and definition of what constitutes a region.

3. Yet Katzenstein’s work fails to systematically code regional institutions on these or other dimensions as the “dependent” variables to be explained, making it difficult to assess his causal arguments and predictions.

4. The US-centered bilateral alliances include US-Japan (1951), US–South Korea (1953), and US-Taiwan (1979 Taiwan Act). In the communist camp, China and North Korea signed a friendship treaty in 1961; Russia and North Korea renewed a treaty on friendship in 2000; and China and Russia signed a new friendship treaty in 2001. As Stephan Haggard pointed out in his comments on the earlier version of this article, the number of Asia’s formal bilateral alliances outside the United States has been extremely limited. For instance, neither Japan nor South Korea has formal alliances with its Asian neighbors, while China has only one formal alliance, with North Korea, which has been significantly undermined in the post–Cold War period.


9. “Club goods” refers to the case of goods that exhibit jointness (not diminished by use), but where exclusion is possible. Two examples of this type of good are the provision of satellite transmission of television and the use of scrambling technology to prevent noncontributors from accessing the good. Because of the benefits of having additional consumers of the good that one
produces, we might expect that in the case of international institutions, actors will compete to have their institutional approach adopted as the standard by all participants to maximize their revenue possibilities.

10. During the Cold War period, trade liberalization was provided for most East Asian countries mainly through the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). To the extent that GATT required membership, the provision of trade liberalization was a multilateral club good. But it contained a strong public good characteristic, since East Asian countries were allowed to pay less to get more out of the system. As noted above, the San Francisco System provided East Asian countries with security as a bilateral club good, made available from their alliance with the United States or the Soviet Union. But the provision also contained a strong public good characteristic, since the costs and benefits from the alliance relationships were asymmetric in favor of the two superpowers’ respective allies. For more details, see Vinod K. Aggarwal and Min Gyo Koo, “Northeast Asia’s Economic and Security Regionalism: Withering or Blossoming?” In Gi-Wook Shin and Daniel C. Sneider, eds., Cross Currents: Regionalism and Nationalism in Northeast Asia (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, forthcoming).


14. Ibid., p. 4. Ruggie did not take note of the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO), created in 1954, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), established in 1967, presumably because SEATO did not prove viable (although it lasted for two decades) and ASEAN came relatively late in the postwar period. But why Asia did not develop a viable multilateral institution in the immediate postwar period ought to have aroused a multilateralism scholar’s curiosity, a point Katzenstein would make in his 2002 article with Hemmer; see Christopher Hemmer and Peter J. Katzenstein, “Why Is There No NATO in Asia? Collective Identity, Regionalism, and the Origins of Multilateralism,” International Organization 56, no. 3 (Summer 2002): 575–607. NATO (which some would not regard as truly multilateral—it is collective defense, rather than an alliance with the characteristics of inclusiveness that is integral to multilateralism) merited a chapter.


23. Ibid., p. 5.


32. Katzenstein stresses practice over discourse in regional construction. Regions are “defined by their distinctive institutional forms which both alter and are altered by behavior or political practice” (Katzenstein 2005, 6). They cannot be simply “ideological constructs” (Katzenstein 2005, 12); Katzenstein speaks of regional identity mainly in terms of history, culture, and institutionalization. I argue that regionalist ideas and discourses are an important part of region building. See Amitav Acharya, The Quest for Identity: International Relations of Southeast Asia (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 2000).
39. Particularly in the security domain, Europe’s past was destined to be Asia’s future. See, for example, Aaron Friedberg, “Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for Peace in Multi-Polar Asia,” International Security 18, no. 3 (1993/94): 5–33; and Buzan and Segal, “Rethinking East Asian Security.”
41. Ben Rosamond, Theories of European Integration (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2000).
42. Balassa, The Theory of Economic Integration.
46. Peter Katzenstein, “East Asia—Beyond Japan.” In Katzenstein and Shiraishi, Beyond Japan, p. 2.
47. Ibid., pp. 10–11.
50. See Katzenstein, “East Asia,” p. 27; and the detailed discussion in Takshi Shiraishi, “The Third Wave: Southeast Asia and Middle Class Formation in the Making of a Region.” In Katzenstein and Shiraishi, Beyond Japan.

51. A recognition, for example, that lay behind the decision of the UK Economic and Social Research Council to make a major investment to research this relationship (see http://www.csgr.org).


55. Ibid., p. 244.


59. Ernst B. Haas, The Obsolescence of Regional Integration Theory (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1975).


65. Rather curiously, Katzenstein does not provide a definition of regionalism in *A World of Regions* (or at least not one that I have discovered in several readings of the book—the index entry for “regionalism, defined” identifies two locations but neither page includes the word). Clearly, given Katzenstein’s emphasis that regions have three significant underpinnings—material, ideational, and institutional—his is a broader understanding than that afforded by the frequently adopted definition of regionalism as a process of intergovernmental collaboration (to distinguish it from *regionalization*—another term that Katzenstein uses but for which he does not offer a definition). For this distinction, see Detlef Lorenz, “Regionalization Versus Regionalism: Problems of Change in the World Economy,” *Intereconomics* 26, no. 1 (January–February 1991): 3–10.


67. In *A World of Regions*, Katzenstein does not repeat earlier claims that regional order “is the central organizing principle in world politics” or that economic regionalism is “an effort to regain some measure of political control over processes of economic globalization that have curtailed national policy instruments.” The first quotation is from Katzenstein, “Varieties of Asian Regionalism,” in Peter Katzenstein et al., eds., *East Asian Regionalism* (Ithaca: Cornell University East Asia Program, 2000), p. 1; the second quotation is from Peter J. Katzenstein and Takashi Shiraishi, “Conclusion: Regions in World Politics: Japan and Asia—Germany in Europe.” In Katzenstein and Shiraishi, *Network Power*, p. 344.


82. Katzenstein, “East Asia—Beyond Japan,” p. 3.


84. I would like to thank Mary F. Katzenstein and Rudra Sil for comments on an earlier draft, and Christopher James Kupka for assistance in updating the figures in endnote 91.


86. For internationalization and globalization theory, respectively, the cases are easy in the following sense. Internal and external security policies il-
 illustrate the logic of states intent on defending their sovereignty; cultural diplomacy is an important way for states to represent themselves to others in the international arena. Technology and production are prime cases illustrating the compression of time and the shrinking of space; the unregulated flow of popular culture connects individuals in a global way.


91. China is making giant economic and political strides. Yet, after fifteen years of explosive economic growth in China and economic stagnation in Japan, in 2005 Japan still accounted for 11 percent of global national income, compared with China’s 5 percent. Japan’s lead over China in total GDP is 2:1 on an aggregate basis and about 20:1 on a per capita basis, with the differences narrowing quickly. This is an important shift, and over time the balance of economic power will rapidly shift further. But just as capitalist China will have its lean years, Japan will have its fat ones. And when those years come, we can only hope that China’s political system will show the same resilience and adherence to democratic norms that have characterized Japan during the last fifteen years. Statistics available at http://www.umsi.edu/services/govdocs/; http://www.umsi.edu/services/govdocs/wofact2005/geos/ch.html; http://www.umsi.edu/services/govdocs/wofact2005/geos/ja.html; http://site resources.worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICS/Resources/GDP_PPP.pdf; http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICS/Resources/GDP.pdf; and http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICS/Resources/GNI.pdf (accessed April 26, 2007).