Security Relations and Institutionalism in Southeast Asia

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I. INTRODUCTION

Southeast Asian countries have traditionally relied on a variety of overlapping arrangements to guarantee their individual and common security. The security institutional equilibrium in Southeast Asia and beyond has consisted of formal and tacit bilateral alliances linking regional states to external players complemented by a series of multilateral arrangements adopting a more comprehensive and cooperative approach to security. Bilateral defense ties, primarily with the United States, have remained central to the regional strategic architecture. Coexisting with and complementing such bilateral links, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and its region-wide initiatives have been at the core of the overlapping multilateral security structure. ASEAN has improved the climate of regional relations and contributed to conflict avoidance and management in Southeast Asia. Rejecting legal mechanisms, its model of security cooperation has traditionally relied on dialogue and consultation, the practices of self-restraint and consensus building and on the principles of national sovereignty and non-interference in the domestic affairs of other states.

The paper examines the origins and evolution of the security institutional architecture within and beyond Southeast Asia. Security and security relations in the region are at the core of the study although attention is also given to the overlap and strategic interaction between security and trade issues, particularly in light of the 1997-98 financial crisis and its implications. The paper offers typologies of security arrangements in Southeast and East Asia in the Cold War and post-Cold War era based on the number of actors involved and on the degree to which such arrangements have been geographically concentrated or dispersed. It then applies an institutional bargaining-game approach to both periods to examine the process by which some of the security arrangements have been created and developed. Particular attention is given to their origins in conjunction with specific regional and external shocks—the Policy of Confrontation and the New Order in Indonesia during the Cold War period and post-1989 the

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1Emmers (2004).
end of the Cold War, the East Asian financial crisis and the terror attacks in United States and Bali in 2001 and 2002 respectively.

The paper argues that the three external shocks faced by the region since 1989 have been pivotal in shaping the institutional security context of Southeast and East Asia today. The negotiated agreements examined as part of the institutional bargaining game model include ASEAN, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the ASEAN + Three (APT), and the ASEAN Security Community (ASC). The final section of the paper highlights key forces for change in the coming 10 to 15 years and explores possible outcomes in the development of security arrangements in Southeast Asia and beyond. The variables considered and how they may impact on the institutional architecture are the US presence in East Asia, China’s role in the region, and regional dynamics in Southeast Asia. The conclusion offers a review of the general findings of the paper and reflects on the strengths and weaknesses of the multilateral security structure in Southeast and East Asia today.
II. ANALYSIS OF TRADITIONAL SECURITY INSTITUTIONAL EQUILIBRIUM IN THE COLD WAR PERIOD

Table 1: Security Arrangements In The Cold War Period

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<th>Arrangements</th>
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Table 1: Security Arrangements In The Cold War Period

Categories of Security Arrangements

To guarantee their security, Southeast Asian states sought during the Cold War period to strengthen their individual armed forces. Singapore, for example, built up its deterrence capabilities through the formation of a professional Singapore Armed Forces (SAF). Yet most Southeast Asian states suffered from socio-economic difficulties that reduced means available for ensuring their national security unilaterally. Consequently, they often sought protection through bilateral agreements.

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2Huxley (2000).
Although bilateral geographically concentrated arrangements were rare in Southeast Asia during this period, two are particularly relevant to note as they dominated the security relations of Laos and Cambodia. The Lao People’s Democratic Republic signed in July 1977 a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with Hanoi. Vietnam stationed 40,000 troops in the country. After the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in December 1978, Phnom Penh signed a Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Cooperation with Hanoi in February 1979. Bilateral defense cooperation agreements were also reached between Malaysia and Thailand and Indonesia respectively.

Bilateral geographically dispersed arrangements played a key role in regional security. Singapore, the Philippines, Thailand, and to a lesser extent Brunei, Indonesia, and Malaysia saw the United States as a protecting power. The San Francisco System was applied to Southeast Asia through the US-Philippine Mutual Defence Treaty of 1951. The US had military bases in the Philippines and Thailand and both states were indirectly involved in the Vietnam War. The Soviet Union also focused on bilateral agreements, including a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation signed with Vietnam in November 1978.

Attempts were made at creating minilateral geographically concentrated arrangements in Southeast Asia in the 1960s. The Association of Southeast Asia (ASA) was formed in Bangkok in July 1961 and included Malaya, the Philippines and Thailand. ASA was affected by the deterioration of Malayan-Philippine relations over Sabah and its operations were interrupted in mid-1963. Consisting of Indonesia, Malaya, and the Philippines, Maphilindo was a loose confederation created through the Manila Agreements of 1963. Its viability was destroyed due to the Indonesian Policy of Confrontation. Established in 1967, ASEAN would be more successful.4

Few minilateral geographically dispersed arrangements existed in Southeast Asia. The Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) was created in February 1955 as a result of the Southeast Asia Collective Defence Treaty, or Manila Pact, of September 1954. SEATO included Australia, Britain,

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3Ross (1988).

4See Acharya (2001); Acharya (2000); Broinowski (1990); Jorgensen-Dahl (1982); Leifer (1989); Simon (1982).
France, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand and the US but never played an active military role. The Anglo-Malayan Defence Agreement was formed in 1957 and rested on a commitment by Britain to guarantee the external defence of Malaya. By 1965, it included Australia, Britain, Malaysia, New Zealand, and Singapore and was replaced in 1971 by a consultative Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) limited to a role of consultation in the case of an external attack.

An Institutional Bargaining Game Approach

Figure 1: Origins of Security and Trade Arrangements

A regional shock preceded the formation of ASEAN in 1967. Indonesian President Sukarno opposed in September 1963 the formation of the Federation of Malaysia by starting a campaign of Confrontation.⁵

⁵See Mackie (1974); Hindley (1964).
Regionalism in Southeast Asia required a transformation in the political environment, which came as a result of Sukarno’s gradual political downfall and a change in political leadership in Indonesia. Lt. General Suharto assumed executive powers in March 1966 and initiated a new era in Indonesian politics known as the New Order. The new military leadership focused on domestic stability and economic development and adopted a pro-western and anti-communist political orientation.

The good can be defined in terms of regional peace and stability. For many Southeast Asian states, the US military presence provided the positive externality/good during the Cold War period. The US had long been considered as “the single most important player in ensuring the region’s strategic equilibrium.” Yet the end of Confrontation and the new military regime in Jakarta stimulated the provision of regional security through a new institutional structure to supplement existing bilateral alliances.

Let us explore the domestic situations of the ASEAN founding members in the mid-1960s. In a post-Confrontation period, the Indonesian leadership needed to be trusted again by its neighbors. Moreover, it wished for a stable regional environment free from external intervention that would enhance domestic political stability and economic development. Malaysia was keen to end confrontation with Indonesia and to improve relations with neighboring states. An amelioration of regional relations was important for both Malaysia and Singapore in light of the British military withdrawal East of Suez first announced in 1967. Singapore remained suspicious of Indonesia and Malaysia and wanted to register its newlyobtained sovereignty. Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew wrote in his memoirs that “Singapore sought the understanding and support of its neighbors in enhancing stability and security in the region.”

Thailand was reliant on the United States against its communist neighbors. Like Bangkok, Manila wanted to complement its defense ties with Washington.

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7Leifer (1989); Emmers (2003).
8Gulick (1969); Leifer (2000).
In terms of political regimes and elite beliefs, the founding members were a group of conservative political regimes where the decision-making power was generally situated within the hands of an authoritarian ruler and small political/military elites. The regimes suffered domestically from weak institutions and socio-economic problems.\(^{10}\) Domestic sources of insecurity, including irredentist and separatist movements, were threatening the survival of the political regimes. In terms of beliefs, elites expected that sub-regional stability would enable them to pay closer attention to domestic development. National and regional stability were thus regarded as indivisible. In contrast to the non-Communist Southeast Asian states, the Indochinese countries shared strong Marxist ideological affinities. The communist victories in Phnom Penh and Saigon in April 1975 and in Laos by the end of the year polarized the region ideologically.

With respect to the existing institutions, a minilateral geographically concentrated arrangement was regarded as complementary to bilateral alliances. That said, the founding members did not all agree on the role of external powers. The Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and to a lesser extent Malaysia relied on their close security ties with the US. They regarded their security as dependent on defense ties outside of a regional framework. In contrast, Indonesia believed in the development of domestic and regional capabilities to reduce external intervention. This ambivalence was later accommodated in the Zone of Peace and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) principle of 1971. It registered a call for regional autonomy but did not restrict the right of the ASEAN members to rely on defense links with external powers and host foreign bases on their territory.

The institutional outcome was the establishment of ASEAN through the Bangkok Declaration of August 1967. As a sub-regional arrangement in Southeast Asia, its original members included Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. North Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia viewed ASEAN as part of the US policy of containment. The nature of ASEAN was to provide a framework for dialogue through which sub-regional peace and stability could be enhanced. Essentially a confidence-building

\(^{10}\)Suryadinata (1996).
exercise, the arrangement rejected military cooperation and focused instead on a comprehensive approach to security. ASEAN was thus no substitute for existing bilateral alliances or SEATO. Its scope went beyond security however. The Bangkok Declaration stated the aims of “economic growth, social progress and cultural development in the region.”\footnote{ASEAN Bangkok Declaration (1967).} ASEAN remained a weak arrangement during its early years. Held in Bali in February 1976, the first summit of ASEAN heads of state and government eventually came in the wake of political transformations in Indochina. Concluded at the summit, the Declaration of ASEAN Concord and the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) in Southeast Asia established a code of conduct for regulating inter-state relations.
### III. NEGOTIATING NEW SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS IN THE “TRIPLE POST-PERIOD”

#### Table 2: Security Arrangements In The Post-Cold War Period

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<th>Arrangements</th>
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Categories of Security Arrangements

Since 1989, the Southeast Asian states have aimed at modernizing their defence forces and acquiring naval capabilities to patrol claimed maritime territories. The modernization programs were however delayed by the East Asian financial crisis of 1997-98. New bilateral geographically concentrated arrangements have also been established. The Southeast Asian states have developed a web of overlapping bilateral collaborations known as the “spider web” approach.\textsuperscript{12} It has involved cooperation between the national defense forces on information exchange, cross-border agreements, training exercises, and naval operations against sea piracy.

Bilateral geographically dispersed arrangements have continued to play a central part in Southeast Asian security. While not a formal ally, Singapore has further developed close military ties with the United States. Despite its often anti-Western rhetoric, Malaysia has also perceived the US presence as necessary to preserve regional stability.\textsuperscript{13} The Philippine Senate denied a new base treaty with the US in September 1991, leading to a complete withdrawal from Subic Bay Naval Base and Clark Air Base by November 1992. Yet the two countries have remained military allies through the 1951 Mutual Defence Treaty. Moreover, Manila signed a Visiting Forces Agreement with the US in February 1998. Brunei has relied on an agreement with Britain renewed in December 1994 that guarantees the presence of a battalion of Gurkha Rifles in the Sultanate. Indonesia signed a security agreement with Australia in December 1995. The latter was revoked, however, by Jakarta in 1999 over the East Timor crisis.

Existing minilateral geographically concentrated institutions have been expanded and deepened, with ASEAN itself growing from ASEAN-6 in 1995 to ASEAN-10 in 1999. The ASEAN heads of state and government endorsed in 2003 the Bali Concord II adopting a framework for the establishment of a Security Community, an Economic Community and a Socio-Cultural Community in Southeast Asia by 2020. New minilateral geographically concentrated arrangements have also been formed including the

\textsuperscript{12}Tan et al. (2002).

\textsuperscript{13}Mak (2004).
Brunei-Indonesia-Malaysia-the Philippines-East Asian Growth Area (BIMP-EAGA) in 1994 and the Greater Mekong Sub-region (GMS) in 2004 with the participation of Cambodia, China, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand and Vietnam. The GMS has focused primarily on environmental security in the Mekong area.

The creation of minilateral geographically dispersed arrangements since 1989 has been spectacular, including APEC, CSCAP, the ARF, ASEM, and the APT. Many of the new institutions were expanded from existing ASEAN frameworks. The ARF grew out of the ASEAN-PMC process, while the APT evolved out of ASEAN. Finally, in December 2005, heads of state and government from the ten ASEAN members, China, Japan and South Korea, as well as Australia, India and New Zealand gathered in Kuala Lumpur for the inaugural session of the East Asia Summit (EAS).

An Institutional Bargaining Game Approach

*End of the Cold War.* The external shock was the end of the Soviet-US and Sino-Soviet rivalries, leading to the resolution of the Cambodian Conflict (1979-1991) and a transformed security environment in Southeast Asia. The disintegration of the Soviet Union in December 1991 dramatically reduced Russia’s regional role.\(^{14}\) The Soviet Union had previously announced in October 1990 its decision to withdraw from Cam Ranh Bay (Vietnam). The Soviet collapse and budgetary constraints forced the US to reconsider its military deployment in East Asia.\(^{15}\) The relative Chinese influence in the region increased based on its sustained economic development and modernization of military capabilities.\(^{16}\)

The end of bipolarity questioned whether the provision of security and stability could continue through the San Francisco system. The increased level of uncertainty led to the search for new security arrangements broader in scope and able to address a series of emerging challenges. Most of such arrangements adopted a minilateral geographically dispersed form.

\(^{14}\)Dibb (1995).

\(^{15}\)Stuart and Tow (1995).

\(^{16}\)See Segal and Yang (1996).
Let us examine the individual situations of the Southeast Asian states. For many of them, the immediate post-Cold War era was characterized by anxiety over the withdrawal of the US military. It was feared that an American redeployment would lead to a power vacuum resulting in rising competition among the major Asian powers. In particular, most Southeast Asian states were disturbed by the prospect of a remilitarized Japan and concerned that China would take advantage of the transformed security architecture to aggressively extend its influence.

Conscious of its vulnerability, Singapore recognized the need for a stable security environment guaranteed by external powers. It reached an agreement with Washington in November 1990 allowing the US Air Force and Navy to use its military facilities more extensively. Singapore was also in favor of extending the sub-regional security dialogue to the Asia-Pacific. Its foreign policy in the post-Cold War era may thus be “described as one of activism in search of political, economic and strategic space.”

Thailand was similarly preoccupied with securing a favorable distribution of power in Southeast Asia. It further developed its relations with the US and Japan in light of a rising China. Thai Prime Minister Chatichai Choonhavan also took advantage of the transformed geopolitics of the region in order to adopt a “New Look Diplomacy” and to improve relations with the Indochinese states. Finally, while previously reluctant to openly support the American presence, Indonesia and Malaysia responded to the US withdrawal from the Philippines by allowing US ships to be repaired and serviced at their facilities.

In terms of political regimes, the decision-making power in many of the Southeast Asian countries was still firmly situated within the hands of an authoritarian ruler. In terms of beliefs, many in Southeast Asia saw the end of the Cold War as an opportunity for the region to shape its destiny. For example, former Malaysian Defence Minister Datuk Najib stressed that “the new strategic environment

19Rolls (1994).
with no clear paradigms yet clearly provides an opportunity for the destiny of the region to be decided by and for ourselves.”

With respect to the existing institutions, the model of bilateral geographically dispersed arrangements was not fundamentally questioned at the end of the Cold War era. Instead, Asia-Pacific multilateralism was regarded by most Southeast Asian states as a means of complementing bilateral ties. In other words, they recognized the need for a new security structure in the post-Cold War era that could supplement rather than replace existing bilateral alliances. Singapore’s Foreign Minister Professor S. Jayakumar would later declare in 1999 that the ARF “is an important vehicle to supplement our bilateral relations with the major powers.”

The Southeast Asian countries shared some common expectations on Asia-Pacific multilateralism. First, the creation of a region-wide arrangement was generally regarded as a way to promote a continuing US involvement in the region and to encourage China into good international behavior. Indonesia was concerned however with extending the ASEAN model to the wider region due to its traditional support for ZOPFAN. Still, Jakarta eventually supported the ARF primarily because it was apprehensive of China’s rising influence. Second, the Southeast Asian countries hoped that they could preserve their diplomatic position by playing a leading role in Asia-Pacific multilateralism. This could be achieved by establishing a dialogue among China, Japan and the US.

The formation of a new arrangement was dependent on the participation of the great powers. While the Bush administration had initially been unwilling to support multilateralism in the Asia-Pacific, US President Bill Clinton welcomed the formation of a security forum. He envisaged it as part of American foreign policy in Asia and as a diplomatic complement to bilateral ties. Although initially

cautious, Japan had come to support the idea of the ARF by 1993. Tokyo perceived it to be a means of advancing its security role without raising fears of an assertive Japan. Finally, China was concerned that the ARF would be used to assert pressure on the Taiwan issue and to limit its rise to great power status. Still, Beijing could not afford to be left out of the arrangement.

In terms of negotiated agreements, the emergence of Asia-Pacific multilateralism entailed an extension of the ASEAN model of security cooperation to the wider region. This culminated in the first ministerial meeting of the ARF in Bangkok in July 1994 gathering 18 foreign ministers.\(^2^5\) The ARF is geographically dispersed and still the only region-wide security arrangement in the Asia-Pacific. The role of track-two organizations should also be identified. The idea of using the ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference (PMC) as a forum for a regional security dialogue was first proposed in 1990 by the ASEAN Institutes of Strategic and International Studies (ASEAN-ISIS). The ARF activities have also been complemented and influenced by CSCAP. In terms of its nature and scope, the ARF is based on the principles of inclusiveness and cooperative security and is meant to focus on dialogue, confidence building and the sharing of information. The ARF has been relatively successful in engaging the great powers and promoting confidence building. Yet it has failed so far to move toward preventive diplomacy.

*The Advent of the Asian Financial Crisis.* The Asian financial crisis (AFC) was a shock that engulfed many of the Southeast Asian economies. It started in July 1997 with the collapse of the Thai Baht and triggered a financial and currency meltdown across the entire East Asian region. In Southeast Asia, the countries hit hardest were Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand.\(^2^6\) The affected countries had to rely on

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\(^2^5\) In 1994, the ARF participants were Australia, Brunei, Canada, China, the European Union, Indonesia, Japan, Laos, Malaysia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, the Philippines, Russia, Singapore, South Korea, Thailand, the United States and Vietnam. Cambodia was admitted in 1995, India and Myanmar in 1996, Mongolia in 1998, North Korea in 2000, and Pakistan in 2004.

\(^2^6\) The Indonesian rupiah fell by 85.4%, the Malaysian ringgit fell by 46.4% and the Thai baht fell by 55.5%. See the National Institute for Defence Studies (2005).
international help, especially from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. The shock was aggravated by the failure of regional institutions, particularly APEC, to respond to the crisis.27

The provision of domestic and regional security and stability was undermined by a non-traditional security challenge. The AFC demonstrated the inter-connectiveness of regional and global financial markets and reaffirmed the region’s economic insecurity.28 The nature of the threat somewhat reshaped institutional structures and influenced their priorities but also provided opportunities for negotiating new arrangements. The latter, as embodied in the APT, were based on a growing recognition of the relationship between economics and security.

Let us examine the domestic situations of the affected countries. The consequences of the AFC facilitated regime change in Indonesia and Thailand. It caused a rise in the participation of the middle class and called for greater governmental accountability and transparency, what Acharya termed the “democratic contagion effect.”29 Prior to the AFC, decision-making in Indonesia was concentrated in the authority of Suharto, as institutional constraints on the presidential power were non-existent.30 While Suharto’s legitimacy was founded on economic prosperity, economic development had been biased towards specific groups and parts of the country, which aggravated the effects of the AFC.31 The crisis contributed to the democratic transition process. Student demonstrations calling for reformasi eventually led to the resignation of Suharto in May 1998.

The impact of the AFC on the political situation in Thailand was also significant. The inability of the government to react and the public’s loss of confidence led to the resignation of Premier Chavalit Yongchaiyudh in November 1997. This paved the way for a more democratic political system under Prime Minister Chuan Leekpai. His Foreign Minister, Surin Pitsuwan, would in June 1998 call for a more

30 MacIntyre (1999).
31 Collins (2003)
flexible interpretation of the non-interference principle in ASEAN. In Singapore, the People’s Action Party (PAP) government emerged from the AFC as one of the strongest advocators of economic and financial transparency in Southeast Asia.32

In terms of elite beliefs, the crisis ended the Asian values debate that some leaders had used to justify their authoritarian rule. Moreover, the AFC challenged the “ASEAN Way”, the defining principle of ASEAN diplomacy. The views of Malaysia’s Prime Minister, Mahathir Mohamed, on the crisis should also be highlighted. He interpreted the AFC to be a Western conspiracy against Asia, “a well planned effort to undermine the economies of all the ASEAN countries.”33 He articulated his dislike of Western-style institutions such as the IMF and the WTO.34 Mahathir’s conception of East Asian regionalism had previously been articulated in the East Asia Economic Group (EAEG) that excluded Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United States.

With regards to existing institutions, the AFC highlighted the inadequate responses of ASEAN, APEC and the IMF. ASEAN was powerless against the economic turmoil and the affected members had to depend on bilateral initiatives to overcome their economic difficulties.35 The effects of the AFC were aggravated by the fact that ASEAN was confronted with other difficulties, including the haze crisis of 1997 and problems of expansion. APEC’s response was also insufficient, leading to a loss of confidence in the arrangement. Successive APEC summits failed to effectively adopt and implement measures to address the crisis.36 Finally, regional initiatives were rejected by Western powers. The Japanese Ministry of Finance had proposed in the early stages of the crisis the establishment of an Asian Monetary Fund. The latter was blocked by the US, the European Union (EU) and the IMF at a meeting in September

32Wee (2001).
34Harris (2000).
35The negotiation of relief packages between the IMF and Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand were settled via bilateral tracks. Wesley (1999).
36Chang and Rajan (1999).
1997. In short, the AFC underscored the need for a new overlapping arrangement capable of better defending the Southeast Asian countries against future shocks.

In term of negotiated agreements, the first APT summit of heads of state and government met in Kuala Lumpur in December 1997 and revived Mahathir’s EAEG project. It was decided in Hanoi the following year that the summit would meet annually. APT participation consists of the 10 ASEAN countries, China, Japan and South Korea. The arrangement is geographically dispersed, although it is still concentrated in the East Asian region. Track-two has played a role in its development. The East Asian Vision Group (EAVG), gathering official and non-official representatives from the 13 East Asian nations, articulated a vision later submitted to the APT summit in November 2001. The nature of the APT process is a manifestation of East Asian regionalism and represents “an attempt by ASEAN to achieve economic security with other East Asian, as opposed to Asia-Pacific partners.” Its scope is focused on economic and financial questions, although it has been involved in non-traditional security issues, like health security during the SARS crisis. In terms of strength, the APT has been an active economic institution (e.g. Chiang Mai Initiative) but it does not yet have the structural capabilities to address security concerns effectively.

The 9/11 Attacks. The terror attacks in the US on 11 September 2001 and the Bali bombings on 12 October 2002 were a third shock that had a direct impact on the security relations of Southeast Asia. The attacks increased the fear of transnational terrorism in Southeast Asia and overshadowed other sources of regional instability. Since 2002, *Jemaah Islamiah* (JI) has been identified as a significant grouping with

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37Rüland (2000).
38See Press Statement by the Chairman of the 7th ASEAN Summit and the 5th ASEAN + 3 Summit, Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei, 5 November 2001.
links with to Al-Qaeda.\textsuperscript{41} JI is said to be fighting for the creation of a Daulah Islamiah Nusantara, a pan-Asian Islamic state that would incorporate Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Brunei as well as areas of Cambodia, the Southern Philippines and Southern Thailand.

The provision of regional peace and stability through existing bilateral and minilateral arrangements was threatened by the unconventional challenge of terrorism sponsored by non-state actors. Although 9/11 led to a diminished sense of security among many Southeast Asian nations, it was the Bali bomb blasts, which killed 202 people and demonstrated the shift from hard to softer targets, that highlighted the threat of radical Islamist terrorism in Southeast Asia.

Let us examine the situations of the Southeast Asian countries and the beliefs of their political elites. Responses by the individual countries varied according to their own threat assessments, domestic political concerns and sensitivities. Indonesia’s President Megawati Sukarnoputri travelled to Washington shortly after 9/11 and promised support in the anti-terrorism campaign. Yet domestic politics, public sentiment and her own ambivalence prevented her from taking effective steps. Moreover, the fall of the Suharto regime in 1998 had not only transformed Indonesia’s domestic political environment but also resulted in the return of exiled radical Muslims demanding political space.\textsuperscript{42} The country’s first-ever direct presidential election in 2004 led to the victory of former Security Minister Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. Having adopted a series of measures, Yudhoyono has also been aware that his counter-terrorism policies must neither be perceived by the general public to be anti-Muslim nor as pro-American.

Initially, Malaysia’s Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad took advantage of 9/11 to discredit the Islamic Party of Malaysia (PAS) by portraying it as a party of Islamic militants. Yet similar to Indonesia, Malaysia has had to balance the demands of its Muslim majority whilst ensuring its engagement in the international anti-terrorism campaign.\textsuperscript{43} In response to 9/11, the Philippines offered its facilities to US

\textsuperscript{41}Gunaratna (2002).

\textsuperscript{42}Abuza (2005).

\textsuperscript{43}Batley (2003).
naval vessels and aircraft and formed an Inter-Agency Task Force Against International Terrorism. Philippine President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo was quick also to describe Abu Sayyaf as an international terrorist movement and accepted US financial aid and military assistance. In January 2002, 600 US forces were deployed to Basilan Island to provide operational assistance against Abu Sayyaf under the umbrella of the Balikatan military exercises.

Singapore has traditionally been concerned of terrorist attacks due to its geographic location and strategic alignment with the US. The arrest of JI militants in December 2001 and the discovery of bomb plots fuelled the city-state’s own sense of vulnerability. In addition to the adoption of domestic measures, Singapore was the first Asian country to sign the Declaration of Principles for the Container Security Initiative (CSI) with the US in September 2002 and to join the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) core group in March 2004. In contrast, countries like Thailand at first and Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam did not feel particularly concerned by the terrorism threat in Southeast Asia. Since 2004, Bangkok has had to face, however, the escalation of Islamic militancy in its Southern provinces.

With regard to existing institutions, the aftermath of 9/11 saw a strategic re-engagement of the United States in the region, as indicated by the closer US-Philippine military ties. Following the Bali bombings, US President George W. Bush even identified Southeast Asia as the second front in the war on terror. In terms of minilateral arrangements, ASEAN adopted the 2001 ASEAN Declaration on Joint Action to Counter Terrorism, which aimed at enhancing intelligence sharing and developing regional capacity building programs. ASEAN also signed a Joint Declaration for Cooperation to Combat International Terrorism with the US in August 2002. With only limited relevance in terms of counter-terrorism, such declarations “have a powerful symbolic value that should not be too readily discounted.” Nonetheless, it is interesting to note that many of the regional responses to terrorism have occurred at a sub-ASEAN level, through bilateral and trilateral agreements. The anti-terrorism pact signed by

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44Banlaoi (2002).
45Singh (2002).
46Ramakrishna (2005) p. 31.
Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines in May 2002 may be observed, for example, as “an indication
that the association is unable to achieve a coordinated response among its entire membership.”

In terms of new agreements, Indonesia suggested at the 36th AMM in Phnom Penh in June 2003
the establishment of an ASEAN Security Community (ASC) in Southeast Asia by 2020, following a
Singaporean proposal to establish an ASEAN Economic Community (AEC). The Indonesian initiative
represented a reaction to the threat posed by terrorism and other transnational threats. It also indicated a
re-engagement of Indonesia with ASEAN after having been absorbed with domestic difficulties since
1998. After the endorsement of the ASC at the 9th ASEAN Summit in Bali in October 2003, Jakarta
introduced over 70 proposals to forge an ASC by deepening cooperation in areas related to political and
security cooperation. The proposed plan of action included a call for the establishment of an ASEAN
Peacekeeping Force, the setting up of an Anti-Terrorism Centre, as well as the promotion of democracy
and human rights.

Ideologies and elite beliefs influenced the intra-ASEAN responses to the Indonesian proposals.
Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam wanted ASEAN to remain a diplomatic arrangement based on
the principles of national sovereignty and non-interference. The main points of contention were related
to references to domestic political governance. ASEAN’s membership has traditionally included military
regimes, authoritarian political systems, absolute monarchies and multi-party rule democracies.
Consequently, the promotion of democracy would have represented a significant change. It was also
unsurprising that many members rejected the peacekeeping force initiative, given that it would have
challenged the ASEAN Way and given the arrangement a “greater role as a collective provider of regional
order and security.” Vietnam’s Foreign Minister, Nguyen Dy Nien, stated that a peacekeeping operation
would be difficult to organize because “each country has its own policy about politics and the military.”

50Haacke (2005) p. 211.
In terms of institutional outcomes, the 2004 AMM agreed on a watered-down version of the ASC Plan of Action, which no longer included the peacekeeping force provision and other controversial ideas. The Plan of Action was later adopted at the ASEAN Summit in Vientiane in November 2004.\textsuperscript{52} The ASC includes the 10 Southeast Asian countries and is a minilateral and geographically concentrated framework. It reiterates the principles of national sovereignty and non-interference as the core ASEAN principles. In terms of its nature and scope, the ASC adopts a comprehensive approach to security and stresses the willingness of the ASEAN members to “rely exclusively on peaceful processes in the settlement of intra-regional differences.”\textsuperscript{53} The ASC should not be regarded however as “a defence pact, military alliance or a joint foreign policy.”\textsuperscript{54} Moreover, as ZOPFAN in 1971, the ASC does not restrict the right of states to rely on bilateral geographically dispersed arrangements to ensure their security. It remains to be seen whether the ASC will be successful.

IV. SCENARIO ANALYSIS OF SOUTHEAST AND EAST ASIAN SECURITY

This section explores possible developments in Southeast and East Asian security and examines how such changes may impact on regional security arrangements. It first highlights key forces for change in the coming 10 to 15 years. Based on previous discussions, three variables are considered: US presence in East Asia, China’s role in the region, and regional dynamics in Southeast Asia.\textsuperscript{55}

A pivotal question is whether the United States will continue to dominate the East Asian security structure. The US is likely to remain the military hegemon for years to come although its exercise of power will be complicated by the rise of China and India. Related to this question are the close relations linking the US to its regional allies and its involvement in multilateral arrangements. The long-term

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\textsuperscript{52} Chairman’s Statement of the 10th ASEAN Summit, Vientiane, 29 November 2004.
\textsuperscript{53} Declaration of ASEAN Concord II (Bali Concord II), Bali, 7 October, 2003.
\textsuperscript{54} Declaration of ASEAN Concord II (Bali Concord II), Bali, 7 October, 2003.
\textsuperscript{55} Goh (2005).
\end{flushleft}
relevance of bilateral and multilateral security structures may be undermined by a rise of unilateralism in US foreign policy. In East Asia, the Bush administration has repeatedly indicated its preference for flexibility and mobility over formal and institutionalized arrangements.56

While China was described as a threat in the 1990s, this perception has gradually changed among Southeast Asian policy elites. China has added diplomatic activism to its growing economic and military growth. Shambaugh writes that, both at a bilateral and multilateral level, “Beijing’s diplomacy has been remarkably adept and nuanced, earning praise around the region.”57 China’s “charm offensive” towards ASEAN is in contrast to its previous suspicion of multilateralism. Nonetheless, considerable uncertainties remain. One is related to the evolution of China’s domestic order and how this may impact on regional stability. Another involves the possibility of a damaging crisis between China and Japan or between China and the United States over Taiwan. Finally, it is still to be seen whether China will continue to be an accommodating rising power vis-à-vis the Southeast Asian states.

Regional dynamics in Southeast Asia, defined in terms of domestic changes and evolving security concerns, represent a third variable. The Southeast Asian region has been undergoing democratization (Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand) and has faced a series of non-traditional security challenges (financial crisis, terrorism, SARS). Such changes in regional dynamics raise a series of questions. First, will the transition to democracy be sustained and how will it impact the stability of key states and the security of the region? Moreover, will internal changes and the growing role of non-state actors have an impact on the institutionalization of Southeast Asia? Finally, will the nature of the challenges facing the region lead to further institution-building as suggested by current efforts to develop an ASEAN Community and Charter?

Let us apply the forces for change to institution-building in Southeast and East Asia by examining possible outcomes. For each of the three variables, two simplified scenarios can be drawn. The scenarios

56Tan (2005).

57Shambaugh (2004/05) p. 64.
apply to ASEAN and the ASEAN-initiated arrangements (ARF, APT, and EAS). In the case of the US presence, the scenarios are an active versus a non-active participation in multilateral regional arrangements. For China’s role, we first assume ongoing domestic order, dependent on sustained economic growth and political stability, as well as Beijing’s continuing participation in security arrangements. By holding on these issues, the scenarios only relate to the nature of China’s involvement in regional arrangements and consist of an accommodative versus an assertive participation. With regard to the third variable, the scenarios are stronger versus weaker regionalism in Southeast Asia.

The best possible outcome for the ASEAN-led initiatives would be an active US participation, an accommodative Chinese involvement, and strong regionalism in Southeast Asia while the worst would be a non-active US participation, an assertive China and weak Southeast Asian regionalism. The former would lead to a stronger ARF complemented by arrangements more limited in their participation and geographical scope like ASEAN, the APT and the EAS. Most of the Southeast Asian states would be satisfied with an institutional framework where multilateral arrangements complement one another in the promotion of peace and stability. The worst outcome would lead to weaker institutional mechanisms, resulting in negative consequences when the region experiences new security shocks. The Southeast Asian countries would also be uncomfortable with an assertive Chinese leadership. Chinese assertiveness could consist of Beijing pressing for change in the norms of cooperation, a restrictive position on the agenda setting, and for an exclusive approach excluding non-Asian participation.

Alternative outcomes should also be considered. A non-active US participation, an accommodative China, and weak regionalism in Southeast Asia would further weaken the ARF and enhance Chinese influence in the APT and the EAS. The negative impact on the ARF of a non-active US participation was recently felt when US Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, decided not to attend the ministerial meeting in Vientiane in July 2005. In contrast, Beijing has made a strong diplomatic push and has been successful in promoting its influence.

Strong regionalism in Southeast Asia combined with a non-active US participation would most likely not succeed in restraining an assertive China. Yet it is unlikely that Washington would continue to
adopt a non-active position if China were to move toward assertive diplomacy. Interestingly, the US has already indicated its concern about the exclusive model of the EAS and there is speculation that it may want to join the arrangement at a later stage.

Southeast Asian regionalism has traditionally developed with a supportive but non-active US participation and a limited Chinese role in the sub-region. Such conditions have changed however as a result of a rising China and its new diplomatic activism. With an accommodative involvement and even more so in the case of an assertive Chinese role, Southeast Asian regionalism would benefit from a more active US participation that looks beyond the mere issues of terrorism and maritime security.

In short, while other variables (e.g. the role of India) could be included, the three factors mentioned will most likely be the key forces for change and impact on institution building in Southeast and East Asia. Two possible developments should be examined closely in the coming years. First, will ASEAN move toward a new era of legalization and institution building based on a growing sense of community and identity as suggested by recent developments (ASEAN Communities and Charter)? Second, it will be interesting to see whether the ASEAN-led security initiatives in the wider region will succeed in complementing each other or whether they will compete and cancel each other out.

V. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

The Southeast Asian region accommodates a great variety of security structures, ranging from unilateral measures to bilateral and minilateral (geographical concentrated and dispersed) arrangements. The nature of such arrangements also varies from military alliances to institutional expressions of cooperative and comprehensive security. Southeast Asian security relations are thus influenced by a series of complementary security structures and approaches. Moreover, the formation and characteristics of the security arrangements have been influenced by the “triple-post period.”

Since the end of the Cold War era, Southeast and East Asia have seen the emergence of new multilateral institutions, such as the ARF, the APT and the EAS, as well as groupings operating at track two levels like the Shangri-La Dialogue and CSCAP. These security structures are meant primarily to
supplement rather than replace existing bilateral ties and alliances. Since the financial crisis, there has been a growing recognition of the close relationship between economics and security. By focusing on economic development as a solution to economic insecurity, the APT has sought to incorporate economic-security linkages as part of its cooperative structures. Having traditionally adopted a comprehensive approach to security, ASEAN also perceives the construction of security and economic communities in Southeast Asia as complementary and mutually reinforcing. The objective is to move toward deeper economic integration while developing a region free from military conflict. Finally, existing institutions are taking on new security roles since 9/11 and the Bali bombings. ASEAN, the ARF and even APEC, originally formed to encourage trade and investment liberalization, have been accorded a role in the campaign against terrorism. Yet it has not just been about terrorism. Issues like health, sea piracy, transnational crime and others have been discussed at the highest diplomatic levels. The hard and soft aspects of security have therefore increasingly been included on the agendas of regional arrangements.

Nonetheless, despite the existence of a growing number of complementing and overlapping structures, minilateral security arrangements in Southeast Asia continue to suffer from an institutional deficit that somewhat limits their structural capacity to respond to security challenges. The regional countries are still protective of their sovereignty and unwilling to give up national autonomy to supranational structures. Strong adherence to national sovereignty and territorial integrity has remained the core principles of ASEAN diplomacy. This is not to say however that a consensus exists among the member states on the need to preserve the status quo. While the new members have been resistant to institutional change, some of the original participants like Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand have pushed for a more flexible application of the non-interference principle. Such debates within ASEAN may result in a multi-layered or two-speed arrangement including members opting for the current level of institutionalisation and others moving forward in specific areas.

Similar structural limitations exist in the ASEAN-led initiatives in East Asia and the Asia-Pacific. The ARF has enjoyed some success in confidence building and in integrating regional great powers into a
security dialogue. Yet it is questionable whether the ARF will succeed in moving from confidence building to preventive diplomacy, as stipulated in the Concept Paper of 1995. Moreover, the great powers have lost some interest in the Forum as indicated by the failure of the foreign ministers of the US, Japan, China and India to attend its 2005 ministerial meeting. The APT does not have the capabilities to effectively address changes in security. In particular, no consensus exists between its two key participants, China and Japan, on the security approach the institution should adopt. The complex relations between Beijing and Tokyo will most likely continue to undermine the APT. Finally, while the inclusion of both China and India immediately raises the profile of the summit, the EAS should in the short to medium term be expected to be another confidence-building exercise in the region.

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